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Abstract
Using a unique data set on trade credit defaults among French ﬁrms, we investigate whether and how
trade credit is used to relax ﬁnancial constraints. We show that ﬁrms that face idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks are more likely to default on trade credit, especially when the shocks are unexpected, ﬁrms
have little liquidity, are likely to be credit constrained or are close to their debt capacity. We estimate
that credit constrained ﬁrms pass more than one fourth of the liquidity shocks they face on to their
suppliers down the trade credit chain. The evidence is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms provide
liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate the consequences of credit
constraints. In addition, we show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches ﬁrms that are large,
liquid, and have access to ﬁnancial markets. This suggests that liquidity is allocated from large ﬁrms
with access to outside ﬁnance to small, credit constrained ﬁrms through trade credit chains.
JEL classiﬁcation: G30, D92, G20
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1Non-Technical Summary
Trade credit is the single most important source of external ﬁnance for ﬁrms. It appears on every
balance sheet and represents more than one half of businesses’ short term liabilities and a third of all
ﬁrms’ total liabilities in most OECD countries. Yet, trade credit tends to be very expensive with implicit
annual interest rates of about 40%. This has sparked a large literature on why ﬁrms use trade credit
despite its high cost. Many theories emphasize that ﬁrms use trade credit because they are unable to
obtain funds from the ﬁnancial sector. Much of the previous empirical literature, starting with Meltzer
(1960) has examined whether ﬁrms increase their use of trade credit under adverse circumstances. In
the same vein, subsequent empirical work has focused on the ﬁnancing role of trade credit and the sub-
stitution eﬀects between trade credit and bank loans at the aggregate level. Under the assumption that
trade credit is substitutable to bank loans, the literature generally argues that simultaneous decreases
in bank loans and increases in trade credit indicate that ﬁrms are unable to obtain ﬁnancing from banks
and that trade credit works to mitigate the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints. This paper proposes a
new empirical identiﬁcation scheme for ﬁrms facing adverse shocks. Hence, it complements the literature
showing that trade credit is counter-cyclical at an aggregate level.
In this paper we do not examine whether large and liquid ﬁrms extend new or more trade credit to
other ﬁrms in the economy during bad times. Instead, we estimate the extent to which credit constrained
ﬁrms pass on adverse liquidity shocks they face by defaulting on their suppliers. We use a French ﬁrm-
level panel data set that contains quarterly information on inter-ﬁrm trade credit defaults. Our data
provide a unique opportunity to investigate the allocation of liquidity among ﬁrms because they enable
us to identify the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faced by ﬁrms and to analyze ﬁrms’ subsequent response
to these shocks tracking them through the corporate sector along trade credit links of ﬁrms. Further,
our data permit to ascertain whether the supplier/customer relationship continues even after defaults.
Given the size of the data set (in excess of 1.8 million observations) we can control for an extensive set
of ﬁrm characteristics, as well as sector and time speciﬁcs h o c k s .
We ﬁnd evidence in favour of the existence of trade credit default chains. Firms that face defaults are
themselves more likely to default. The estimates suggest that ﬁrms more likely to be credit constrained
are able to pass on more than one fourth of their unexpected liquidity shocks by defaulting on trade
credit, while large, liquid ﬁrms with access to outside ﬁnance do not pass on trade credit defaults they
face. Our ﬁndings are consistent with theories explaining the existence of trade credit as providing
ﬁnance to credit constrained ﬁrms. The results particularly lend credence to Cuñat’s (2006) liquidity
insurance theory and the existence of shared rents between customers and suppliers, who accommodate
defaults.
Our results suggest that (i) credit constraints are prevalent among small French ﬁrms; (ii) the option
to default on trade credit permits credit constrained ﬁrms to cope with adverse liquidity shocks; (iii)
we interpret the mechanism as liquidity insurance through trade credit, because we have evidence that
ﬁrms continue to supply ﬁrms that have defaulted to them in the past; (iv) in addition to providing
such insurance, large, liquid and non credit constrained ﬁrms inject fresh liquidity into the system. (v)
This liquidity is allocated via trade credit default chains within the corporate sector.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
We use new data on French ﬁrms to investigate the role of trade credit links among ﬁrms. We ﬁnd
evidence that they result in chains of default, and argue that these chains may serve a useful role
in allocating liquidity from large ﬁrms with access to outside ﬁnance to credit constrained ﬁrms. By
defaulting on trade credit, credit constrained ﬁrms are able to alleviate the eﬀects of idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks. We show that a large portion of liquidity shocks are ultimately absorbed by ﬁrms with
access to outside ﬁnance further down the trade credit chain. The evidence supports theories that view
trade credit as an important source of ﬁnancing for credit constrained ﬁrms.
Trade credit is the single most important source of external ﬁnance for ﬁrms. It appears on every
balance sheet and represents more than one half of businesses’ short term liabilities and a third of
all ﬁrms’ total liabilities in most OECD countries. Yet, trade credit tends to be very expensive with
implicit annual interest rates of about 40%.1 This has sparked a large literature on why ﬁrms use
trade credit despite its high cost. Many recent theories emphasize that ﬁrms use trade credit because
they are unable to obtain funds from the ﬁnancial sector. A number of reasons have been oﬀered why
suppliers may still be willing to lend when banks are not, including that suppliers have more accurate
information about their customers than banks (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), that
suppliers have advantages in liquidating collateral (Mian and Smith, 1992; Frank and Maksimovic, 1998;
Longhofer and Santos, 2003), that moral hazard and cash diversion problems may be less important for
interﬁrm relationships than for bank-ﬁrm relationships (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) and that suppliers
and their customers may have a common interest in mutual survival due to shared rents from long
standing business relationships (Wilner, 2000; Cuñat, 2006). This paper not only shows that there
seems to be interﬁrm lending via trade credit links to credit constrained ﬁrms, but that trade credit
serves two distinct functions. One, suppliers may insure their customers against liquidity shocks and
second, liquidity is allocated within the corporate sector along trade credit chains to where it is needed
most, i.e. where credit constrained ﬁrms experienced adverse shocks.
Much of the previous empirical literature, starting with Meltzer (1960) has examined whether ﬁrms
increase their use of trade credit under adverse circumstances. Meltzer (1960) showed that in periods of
monetary tightening, large liquid ﬁrms increase the amount of trade credit extended. In the same vein,
subsequent empirical work has focused on the ﬁnancing role of trade credit and the substitution eﬀects
between trade credit and bank loans at the aggregate level. Under the assumption that trade credit is
substitutable to bank loans, the literature generally argues that simultaneous decreases in bank loans
and increases in trade credit indicate that ﬁrms are unable to obtain ﬁnancing from banks (Kashyap et
al., 1993) and that trade credit works to mitigate the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints (Calomiris et
al., 1995). This paper proposes a new empirical identiﬁcation scheme for ﬁrms facing adverse shocks.
Hence, it complements the literature showing that trade credit is counter-cyclical at an aggregate level.2
1Tirole (2006) reports that about 80% of the US ﬁrms oﬀer their products on terms called "2-10 net 30", which means
that the buyer must pay within 30 days, but receives a 2% discount if payment occurs within 10 days. Similar terms can
be observed in most European countries.
2The observation of counter-cyclical behaviour of trade credit at the aggregate level may not only be consistent with
the idea that ﬁrms are credit constrained but also with other explanations. For example, even in the absence of credit
constraints, ﬁrms may well demand more trade credit during economic downturns in order to attract the suppliers that
supply the best quality products, or supply more trade credit to attract new customers.
3In this paper we do not examine whether large and liquid ﬁrms extend new or more trade credit to
other ﬁrms in the economy during bad times. Instead, we estimate the extent to which credit constrained
ﬁrms pass on adverse liquidity shocks they face by defaulting on their suppliers. We use a ﬁrm-level
panel data set that contains quarterly information on inter-ﬁrm trade credit defaults. Our data provide
a unique opportunity to investigate the allocation of liquidity among ﬁrms because they enable us to
identify the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faced by ﬁrms and to analyze ﬁrms’ subsequent response to
these shocks tracking them through the corporate sector along trade credit links of ﬁrms. Further,
our data permit to ascertain whether the supplier/customer relationship continues even after defaults.
Given the size of the data set (in excess of 1.8 million observations) we can control for an extensive set
of ﬁrm characteristics, as well as sector and time speciﬁcs h o c k s .
We ﬁnd evidence in favour of the existence of trade credit default chains. Firms that face defaults
are themselves more likely to default. The estimates suggest that ﬁrms are able to pass on more than
one fourth of their unexpected liquidity shocks by defaulting on trade credit. Large, liquid ﬁrms with
access to outside ﬁnance do not pass on trade credit defaults they face, even though they face the
bulk of the defaults in the data. Our ﬁndings are consistent with theories explaining the existence of
trade credit as providing ﬁnance to credit constrained ﬁrms (e.g. Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and
Rajan, 1997; Frank and Maksimovic, 1998; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004 and Cuñat, 2006). The results
particularly lend credence to Cuñat’s (2006) liquidity insurance theory and the existence of shared rents
between customers and suppliers, who accommodate defaults. However, the interactions within the
corporate sector documented in this paper are more complex than simple bilateral customer-supplier
relationships. The results suggest that there is not only mutual but also multilateral insurance as well as
liquidity provision among ﬁrms. All types of ﬁrms, including credit constrained ﬁrms, supply liquidity
insurance to their customers. Credit constrained ﬁrms can aﬀord to insure their customers because they
are themselves insured by their suppliers. We show that liquidity shocks are transmitted down trade
credit chains until they reach ﬁrms with access to outside ﬁnance ("deep pockets"), which ultimately
absorb the shocks. By extending the maturity period of trade credit to their defaulting customers, deep
pockets do not only relax the ﬁnancial constraints faced by their direct customers but also of those
faced by their customers’ customers and other ﬁrms they do not have direct business relationships with.
Hence, large ﬁrms with access to outside ﬁnance inject fresh liquidity into the corporate sector.
In a nutshell, our results suggest that (i) credit constraints are prevalent among small French ﬁrms;
(ii) the option to default on trade credit permits credit constrained ﬁrms to cope with adverse liquidity
shocks; (iii) we interpret the mechanism as liquidity insurance through trade credit, because we have
evidence that ﬁrms continue to supply ﬁrms that have defaulted to them in the past; (iv) in addition
to providing such insurance, large, liquid and non credit constrained ﬁrms inject fresh liquidity into the
system. (v) this liquidity is allocated via trade credit default chains within the corporate sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. As the data have never been used for research,
we document them in relatively great detail in section 2 and present extensive descriptive statistics.3
The basic results are shown in section 3. Section 4 contains a number of extensions and robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes.
3The only exception is Bardos and Stili (2006), who provide some interesting descriptive statistics on the transmission
of shocks across sectors.
42D a t a
The compilation of the data set starts with a combination of two data sources from the Banque de
France: the CIPE ("Fichier Central des Incidents de Payment sur Eﬀets") and a ﬁrm balance sheet
database, the FIBEN ("FIchier Bancaire des ENtreprises") databank. CIPE contains information on
all ﬁrms’ defaults of payment related to trade bills. Defaults are recorded on a daily basis. In CIPE a
"default" is deﬁned as a trade bill between two ﬁrms which is not paid in full and/or on time.4 FIBEN
contains detailed information on essentially all French ﬁrms’ annual balance sheets and proﬁta n dl o s s
accounts. We describe both datasets and the procedure for merging the two in more detail in the
appendix (see also Bardos and Stili, 2006).
The main diﬃculty in merging the two datasets is their diﬀerent frequency. CIPE is a daily dataset
and FIBEN contains annual balance sheet information. Ultimately, we decided to construct a quarterly
data set. To construct it, we proceeded in three steps (for a detailed description, see the appendix).
First, we excluded ﬁrms whose balance sheet was not available, ﬁrms in agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, real
estate activities, and education, health and social work, as well as the public sector and ﬁnancial and
insurance ﬁrms. We also dropped all micro-ﬁrms, that is ﬁrms with less than EUR500,000 of assets or
less than 10 employees, as well as all ﬁrm-quarter observations for which our main explanatory variables
(i.e. assets, purchases, sales, accounts payable and receivable) were missing.
Second, we transformed the daily information on defaults in CIPE into quarterly data. We created
dummies equal to one for ﬁrm i in quarter t if ﬁrm i defaulted at least once during quarter t,a n d
calculated the total amount and the number of defaults made by ﬁrm i in quarter t. We generated
equivalent variables for the defaults faced. Third, we matched the transformed CIPE data of every ﬁrm
i and quarter t with the corresponding balance sheet data. When ﬁrm i did not default in quarter t (i.e.
the ﬁrm is not present in CIPE in quarter t), we assigned the value 0 to its statistics on defaults and
kept its balance sheet information in the database. We assigned to ﬁrm i in quarter t its most recent
balance sheet available between quarters t−5 and t, and dropped the ﬁrm when its most recent balance
sheet was more than ﬁve quarters old. Hence, the same balance sheet information is assigned to ﬁrm i
between quarters t − j and t when ﬁrm i last released its balance sheet in quarter t − j (for j 6 5). As
we will use the lags of the explanatory variables in our regressions, we also dropped, for every quarter,
the ﬁrms that were not present in the panel in the previous quarter. Ultimately, our data set includes
1,8 million ﬁrm/quarter observations for a total of 121,060 ﬁrms over the period 1998-2003 (see table
2.1).
[Insert table 2.1 about here]
Table 2.2 shows that the average ﬁrm in our sample has total assets of almost EUR14 million.
The size distribution is skewed: The median ﬁrm has only EUR2 million in total assets. Firms on
average are 22 years old, but the data set contains the entire range from very young to very mature
ﬁrms. Nevertheless, by deleting the ﬁrms smaller than EUR500,000, we have eliminated most upstarts.
4This deﬁnition is diﬀerent from commonly used deﬁnitions of "default" in bank accounting (i.e. non-performing loans).
Loans are generally only classifed as in "default" after the ﬁrm has missed interest payments for several months. This
deﬁnition is closely in line with the idea of suppliers accepting late payments of already extended debts (Wilner, 2000;
Cuñat, 2006).
5Almost all ﬁrms have accounts payable and receivable in their balance sheet and therefore extend and
receive trade credit. Receivables represent more than 25% of the median ﬁrm’s total assets and payables
about 20%. Payables are more than four times as large as bank debt (including overdrafts). This
highlights the importance of trade credit as a source of ﬁnancing for French ﬁrms.5 The positive average
net trade credit position (6% of assets) is due to trade credit to households, which are not part of
the data set. Finally, liquid assets (deﬁned as the sum of cash and short term marketable securities)
represent almost 10% of ﬁrms’ total assets on average. Overall, as is outlined in more detail in the
appendix, the sample is near exhaustive of French manufacturing, wholesale and retail ﬁrms above our
speciﬁed size requirement of EUR500,000 in total assets or 10 employees.
[Insert table 2.2 about here]
U s i n gas t a n d a r dc l a s s i ﬁcation of small, medium and large ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that small ﬁrms form
the majority of our data set in terms of number of ﬁrms. 74% of all ﬁrms have total assets below
EUR5 million and only 11% of the ﬁrms more than EUR15 million (see table 2.3). However, large
ﬁrms represent more than 80% of aggregate total assets in our database, and more than 70% of trade
(sales and purchases), receivables and payables. The extensive coverage of small ﬁrms in our data set
is a strength as we expect that credit constraints, trade credit defaults and trade credit chains to be
particularly important in this segment of the corporate sector.
[Insert table 2.3 about here]
Let us now examine trade credit defaults in some more depth. Summary statistics are given in table
2.4. Consider the last column of the table ﬁrst. Defaults are relatively common: on average 18.5% of
the ﬁrms default at least once per quarter while 7.2% are defaulted upon at least once per quarter. The
diﬀerence reﬂects that we do not identify all defaults faced, while the data are exhaustive in defaults
made.6 As we discuss below, it also reﬂects an asymmetry between defaults faced and made. In total,
in our sample ﬁrms defaulted on EUR5.4 billion and faced default of EUR2.1 billion.
One of the crucial features of the data set is that it contains information on the reason for the default.
There are four main reasons (see also section A2 in the appendix):
Disagreement:t h eﬁrm rejected the claim because it disagreed on the terms of the bill as presented
by its bank, or because it was not satisﬁed with the delivered goods;
Omission:t h eﬁrm omitted to pay, i.e. it neither endorsed nor repudiated the bill;
Illiquidity:t h eﬁrm did not have, momentarily, the suﬃcient provisions on its bank account to
pay the bill on time and in totality;
Insolvency:t h eﬁrm ﬁled for bankruptcy or was in a liquidation process.
5Bonds and commercial paper represent a negligible fraction of French ﬁrms’ total debt.
6Notably, we could identify only about 85% of the ﬁrms that faced defaults in CIPE. This is a consequence of having to
match on name, rather than identiﬁcation number with regards to defaults faced. More explanations are in the appendix,
where we also show that the (non-)identiﬁcation of the suppliers in CIPE is random.
6Table 2.4 shows that the most prevalent reason for defaulting on trade credit is disagreement (16.2% of
the ﬁrm/quarter observations), followed by illiquidity (2.1% of the ﬁrm/quarter observations). Omission
and insolvency are relatively rare occurrences at 1% and 0.4%, respectively. Given a ﬁrm defaults, the
size of the default is almost EUR16,000 on average in a quarter, but this hides considerable variation
across reasons. If it the default is due to disagreement regarding the good delivered, average default is
EUR11,600, while if the reason for default is illiquidity or insolvency, average defaults are much larger
(around EUR40,000). For the defaults faced we observe the opposite pattern. Even though our summary
statistics on defaults faced do not account for all defaults, defaults faced for disagreement are higher at
EUR15,500 than the defaults made on average for the same reason. In contrast the amounts faced due
to illiquidity and insolvency are considerably smaller than the defaults made.
[Insert table 2.4 about here]
Table 2.4 suggests that ﬁrms face individually more defaults than they make and that defaults
are asymmetric across motives. Their magnitude appears to depend on which party (the customer or
the supplier) is at the "origin" of the default. In case of disagreement, the origin of default is the
supplier, who did not deliver the expected (or delivered poor quality) products. A ﬁrm that supplies
poor products may therefore be defaulted upon by several customers and face large amounts of defaults
due to disagreement. Data on the average number of defaults faced within a quarter support this
interpretation as the ﬁrms that are defaulted upon due to disagreement face on average 3 defaults in the
same quarter, against an average of around 2 when the defaults are due to ﬁnancial distress (illiquidity or
insolvency). In contrast, when defaults are due to ﬁnancial distress, the "fault" lies with the customer,
who does not have suﬃcient funds to pay. A ﬁnancially distressed customer therefore defaults several
(eight to nine) times in the same quarter. Firms defaulting due to disagreement do so only 2.5 times
per quarter.
Are defaults large enough to be relevant for the ﬁrms? Table 2.5 shows how large trade credit
defaults are relative to ﬁrms’ size and operations. The mean amount of default is 0.5% of total assets.
This seems small. However, note that we are comparing an end of year stock variable (total assets) with
aq u a r t e r l yﬂow variable (defaults). A more meaningful statistic may be to examine defaults relative
to payables, which is 2% on average. The tails of the distribution may even be more informative than
the mean and suggest that at least for some ﬁrms (top 1% tail, i.e. about 18,000 ﬁrms) they represent
a sizeable share of their assets (above 8 percent) or payables (about 30%). From this perspective it
may be even more interesting to examine defaults faced, as this represents a liquidity shock to the ﬁrm.
Compared to total assets, defaults faced by ﬁrms are small: on average 0.2%; in terms of receivables it
is just below 2%. When comparing ﬂows to ﬂows and to available cash, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ exposure to
non-payments can be substantial. Quarterly defaults represent on average 4.8% of ﬁrms’ annual gross
operating surplus and 43.7% of current liquid assets. In the one percent tail of the distribution, defaults
faced can amount to a multiple of liquid assets and more than 50% of the ﬁrms gross operating surplus.
[Insert table 2.5 about here]
The fact that ﬁrms may face defaults that represent a good deal of their annual operating proﬁts
and may exceed the available liquid assets suggests that being defaulted upon may in some cases be far
7from innocuous to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health.7 If a ﬁrm faces liquidity constraints and therefore is unable to
pay its trade bills on time through increases in short-term loans or a credit line, then it has two options.
First, it can raise cash by reducing its inventories, its planned investment, or by liquidating assets, all
of which solutions are potentially costly to the ﬁrm. Second the ﬁrm can default on its suppliers and
create the starting point of a trade credit default chain. This is the focus of the paper.
[Insert tables 2.6a and 2.6b about here]
To get a ﬁrst sense of whether trade credit default chains exist, we report in table 2.6a the un-
conditional probability to default in a given quarter against the probability to default conditional on
being defaulted upon in the previous quarter for small ﬁrms and compare it to the same statistic for
large ﬁrms, which are less likely to be credit constrained (table 2.6b). The ﬁgures support our basic
ideas. While the unconditional probability that a small ﬁrm defaults at least once due to illiquidity
in a given quarter is 2.5%, this probability increases to 2.7% when the ﬁrm faced a default the same
quarter, irrespective of the reason. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. For large
ﬁrms we ﬁnd no such eﬀect: large ﬁrms are equally (un-)likely (0.6%) to default irrespective of whether
or not they experienced a liquidity shock. Note also that this is the case despite the fact that they are
much more likely to face default (17.3% versus 4.8% of the ﬁrm/quarter observations). Of course, these
ﬁgures are unconditional on ﬁrm characteristics. For example, the ﬁrm may be operating in a weak
sector (where defaults are common) or the ﬁrm may be poorly managed. Poor management of the ﬁrm
may result in a higher likelihood of facing defaults (due to a poor quality of goods or a poor selection
of customers) and simultaneously in a higher likelihood of defaulting (due to poor cash management).
We address these issues in the econometric analysis below.
3E c o n o m e t r i c A n a l y s i s
In order to examine whether ﬁrms provide ﬁnancing to each other in times of distress we test a series
of interrelated hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. [Trade credit default chains] A ﬁrm is more likely to default to a supplier due to
illiquidity if it faces an adverse liquidity shock.
We will measure a liquidity shock in the data as the case in which a ﬁrm faces default. Under
hypothesis 1, we should expect idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to trigger chains of trade credit defaults.
However, if defaulting on trade credit is costly, only ﬁrms that are more likely to be credit constrained
should take this option, rather than raise fresh external funds. Hence, hypothesis 1 can be reﬁned to
state:
Hypothesis 2. [Credit constraints] Firms that are ex ante more likely to be credit constrained are
more likely to default once faced with an adverse liquidity shock. Firms with access to outside ﬁnance
are not.
7If these shocks are not innocuous, why don’t ﬁrms insure against them using trade credit insurance or factoring? Our
understanding of the practice of trade credit insurance contracts suggests that they tend to cover the case of insolvency
of the customer, rather than the type of payment delay as in our data. Hence, trade credit insurance would only insure
against defaults due to insolvency, which represent less than 0.5% of the observations. Dropping these observations does
not aﬀect the results (available from the authors upon request).
8The evidence regarding hypothesis 2, if conﬁrmed, would suggest that ﬁrms default due to the
presence of credit constraints. Indeed it would be strong evidence of their existence. If ﬁrms unlikely to
be credit constrained also are more likely to default if faced with a liquidity shock, this would suggest
that defaulting is costless and unrelated to credit constraints. Further, if non-credit constrained ﬁrms
do not default once faced with a liquidity shock, this suggests that they inject new liquidity into the
corporate sector. Since ﬁrms are linked via trade credit default chains, this liquidity is ultimately
allocated to credit constrained ﬁrms. This is the idea behind Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3. [Liquidity allocation] Firms with access to outside ﬁn a n c ea b s o r bad i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e
number of liquidity shocks and do not default.
Finally, we want to check whether the fact that credit constrained ﬁrms default and liquidity is
allocated is a reﬂection of relationships among ﬁrms and liquidity insurance in the spirit of Cuñat
(2006). We examine this question by checking whether we observe that customers default to the same
supplier more than once.
Hypothesis 4. [Interﬁrm relationships] Firms continue to supply trade credit to customers that de-
f a u l t e di nt h ep a s td u et oi l l i q u i d i t y .
In order to examine these hypotheses, we focus on defaults due to illiquidity as the dependent
variable. We estimate the probability that ﬁrm i defaults at least once on its trade credit in quarter
t due to illiquidity; df tmade_dum3it, as a function of its characteristics and whether it experienced a
liquidity shock in quarter t−1. A liquidity shock is measured as whether or not the ﬁrm faced a default
(no matter what the reason) in quarter t − 1,d f l t f a c e d _dum1234it−1 and how large this shock was
with respect to its total assets in quarter t − 1, df ltf aced_amount1234it−1.8
In all models, we use an extensive set of sector-quarter dummies, based on the two-digit NES
16 classiﬁcation, as well as regional dummies intended to control for sectoral, quarterly, and regional
shocks. In addition, our basic speciﬁcation includes a set of variables aimed at controlling for the ﬁrm
characteristics that may also aﬀect the probability of default. They are largely based on variables
that have been used extensively in the trade credit literature (e.g. Peterson and Rajan, 1997) and the
corporate ﬁnance literature (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2005). Firms with a long track record should ﬁnd
it easier to raise external funds. Hence, we include the logarithm of the ﬁrm’s age (ageit). We expect
age to have a negative eﬀect on the probability to default. Similarly, we use the logarithm of total
assets in the previous quarter (assetit−1)f o rﬁrm size. Again, we expect large ﬁrms to have a lower
probability to default due to liquidity problems than small ﬁrms, which are a priory more likely to be
credit constrained.9 We also include the logarithm of the purchases to total assets ratio (purchaseit−1),
for a ﬁrm may have more payments coming due when it purchases more goods and the logarithm of the
sales to total assets (salesit−1) ,w h i c hw ee x p e c tt oh a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the probability of default
as ﬁrms with higher sales generate more cash ﬂow.
8Note our notation here: we have two dummy variables: dﬂtmade_dum and dﬂtfaced_dum. Continuous variables are
denoted as dﬂtmade_amount and dﬂtfaced_amount. The numbering "1234" indicates the reason for default, i.e. reason
1 is disagreement, reason 2 is omission, reason 3 is illiquidity and reason 4 is insolvency (see the previous section).
9This is not the case for the other types of defaults, notably those due to disagreement. In our database large and
old ﬁrms indeed default relatively more often because of disagreement than small ﬁrms do, simply because they purchase
more supplies and also because they may be more assertive in enforcing quality standards with their suppliers.
9Further, we include the logarithm of one plus the liquid asset to total asset ratio (liquid assetit−1)
and the logarithm of one plus the receivables to total asset ratio (receivablesit−1)a sp r o x i e sf o rﬁrms’
repayment capacity. Receivables can be viewed as a type of liquid assets, insofar as ﬁrms may pledge
them as collateral in order to raise cash from banks.10 Hence, we would expect a negative relationship
to the probability to default. Alternatively, receivables might be viewed as a variable related to the
ﬁrm’s quality. Ferris (1981) and Brennan et. al. (1988) have argued that ﬁrms that have a diﬃcult time
selling their products may be more likely to accept being paid on credit. In this case, receivables would
then be positively related to the probability of default. On the liability side, we use the logarithm of one
plus the accounts payables to total assets ratio (payablesit−1) to control for ﬁrms’ exposure to defaults
given size, for ﬁrms with more trade debt should be more likely to default.
The ability to raise external funds aﬀects the probability of default. Hence, we include three variables
measuring the degree to which ﬁrms can access external ﬁnance. First, we use the logarithm of one plus
the total bank debt to total liabilities ratio to control for ﬁrms’ leverage (bank debtit−1). A priory, the
relationship of the share of bank debt in total assets and the probability of defaulting on trade credit
is ambiguous. If a higher share of bank debt reﬂects relatively easy access to external ﬁnance then
ﬁrms with high shares of bank debt should be less likely to default. On the other hand, ﬁrms with high
leverage may have a lot of ﬁxed obligations related to the debt and may be close to their borrowing
capacity. In addition, they may be dependent on the further goodwill of their bank and therefore prefer
to default on their suppliers rather than on their bank. All of this would suggest that ﬁrms with a lot
of bank debt may be more likely to default.
Given this ambiguity, we also include the logarithm of one plus the share of used credit lines in
total liabilities (overdraftt−1). Following the recent evidence by Suﬁ (2006) that access to credit lines
is a good indicator for credit constraints, we would have liked to include a dummy variable measuring
whether or not the ﬁrm has access to a credit line. However, we only observe whether or not the ﬁrm
uses credit lines (and to which extent). Put diﬀerently, a zero in used credit lines may reﬂect that the
ﬁrm does not have access to a credit line or it may reﬂect that it does not use its credit line. In any
case, if ﬁrms resort to ﬁnancing a high share of their liabilities with credit lines, which presumably are
relatively expensive, this may suggest that they face diﬃculties with obtaining cheaper long term ﬁnance
and that they are close to the limits on their debt capacity. Hence, we expect a positive relationship
between used credit lines and the probability to default. Finally, we use a dummy equal to one if ﬁrm i
has been publicly listed over the sample period and to zero otherwise (listedi). Listed ﬁrms are unlikely
to be credit constrained and, therefore, are expected to be less likely to default on trade credit. The
results are discussed in the next section.
3.1 Baseline Results
Our baseline results are reported in table 3.1. Model 1 shows that, given size, age is not signiﬁcantly
related to the probability to default. As expected, however, larger ﬁrms are less likely to default on
trade credit due to illiquidity. Similarly, sales, receivables and liquid assets have a negative impact
on the probability to default, while purchases and payables have a positive impact. This is consistent
10Receivables are the sum of the balance sheet item "receivables" and the receivables that have been pledged as collateral
against a bank loan. These receivables exited the balance sheet but are still due to the ﬁrm.
10with the idea that ﬁrms with large working capital requirements are more likely to default and ﬁrms
purchasing more on credit are also more likely to default. A higher share of bank debt and a higher
share of overdrafts increases the probability of default, in line with a trade-oﬀ between paying bank
or trade debts. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Perhaps most surprising is the positive
coeﬃcient (signiﬁcant at the 5% level) of the dummy related to whether or not the ﬁrm is publicly
listed. We speculate that since there are only very few listed ﬁrms in the sample (just above 300) and
they are also among the largest, we may be picking up some interaction with our size measure (the log
of total assets). The dummy may be capturing second order eﬀects related to the need, rather than
the ability, to raise external funds, which is underlying the ﬁrm’s decision to publicly list in the ﬁrst
place. To check this interpretation, we estimated the same model without total assets and, as initially
expected, we found a strong negative eﬀect of being publicly listed on the probability to default.
In model 2 we include a credit score variable calculated by the Banque de France, score3yearsit−1,
which is a synthetic indicator of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health. Its calculation is quite similar to Altman’s Z
score.11 Score is increasing in poor ﬁnancial health, suggesting a positive coeﬃcient, which is what we
ﬁnd. As expected, it takes away explanatory power from the basic debt and ﬁnancial ratios, whose
coeﬃcients remain however statistically signiﬁcant with the same sign as in regression 1. The strong
increase in the Wald statistic from regression 1 to regression 2 suggests that score3yearsit−1 contains
relevant additional information on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health in addition to the ﬁnancial ratios. Hence all
further models will include this variable.
[Insert table 3.1 about here]
In order to test hypothesis 1, we include in model 3 a dummy measuring whether or not the ﬁrm
faced a default in the previous quarter (df ltf aced_dum1234it−1)a sw e l la s ,i nm o d e l4 ,t h ea m o u n to f
these defaults (df ltf aced_ amount1234it−1). First we note that these two additional variables do not
change the sign or magnitude of the control variables. This means that defaults faced capture additional
information, possibly reﬂecting that these new variables are related to ﬁrms’ customers (while the control
variables are related to ﬁrms themselves). In this sense they seem to be exogenous liquidity shocks to
the ﬁrm; nevertheless we explore the exogeneity of the variable further in section 4.1. Second, we ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant sign for the lagged default dummy in both models, which means that ﬁrms are
more likely to default due to illiquidity when they themselves faced defaults last period. This result is
conﬁrmed in model 4, where in addition to the dummy of defaults faced, the amount of default faced
also increases the probability of default. Firms are more likely to default due to liquidity problems if
they themselves have been defaulted upon in the previous quarter and this probability is increasing in
the amount of the defaults faced.
Hence, we ﬁnd evidence in favour of hypothesis 1: Trade credit default chains appear to exist. Next,
we turn to tests of hypotheses 2 and 3.
11T h es c o r ev a r i a b l eo ft h eB a n q u ed eF r a n c escore3yearsit is the probability that ﬁrm i either goes bankrupt (liquidation
or reorganisation) or defaults on a large fraction of its bank debt at a 3 year horizon from quarter t onward. This variable
summarizes balance sheet ratios only and does not include any soft information or information about the defaults on trade
credit faced or made by ﬁrm i. The methodology and main ﬁn a n c i a lv a r i a b l e su s e db yt h eB a n q u ed eF r a n c et oc o n s t r u c t
this probability are described in Bardos et al. (2004).
113.2 Credit Constraints and Liquidity Provision by Firms
In the previous section we demonstrated that ﬁrms generally react to a liquidity shock by defaulting on
their suppliers in a chain of trade credit defaults. In this section we examine the question of whether
this chain ends once the shock is passed on to large and liquid ﬁrms (hypotheses 2 and 3). If it is the
case that only small and illiquid ﬁrms pass on liquidity shocks, then this would be evidence (i) that
these ﬁrms are credit constrained; (ii) that non-credit constrained ﬁrms supply liquidity to ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms through trade credit; and (iii) that liquidity is allocated in the corporate sector along
trade credit chains.
We estimate the model separately for ﬁrms more likely and those ﬁrms less likely to face credit
constraints. We use two standard candidate variables to distinguish the two groups of ﬁrms: liquid and
illiquid ﬁrms; large and small ﬁrms, complemented by a third distinction related to the rating assigned
b yt h eB a n q u ed eF r a n c e ,w h i c he n a b l e sab a n kt ou s eaﬁrm credit as collateral in reﬁnancing operations
(see below).
For the results consider table 3.2. First, in models 5a and 5b, we show that liquid ﬁrms, which
are deﬁned as ﬁrms with above median liquid asset to total asset ratios, are signiﬁcantly less likely to
default due to illiquidity. In the ﬁrst instance, this is simply conﬁrming the validity of the reasons for
default given in our data set. Liquid ﬁrms are quite unlikely to default for illiquidity: the unconditional
probability of default is 0.63% (reported at the bottom of the table). Illiquid ﬁrms, in contrast, show a
probability of default of 3.58%. However, liquid ﬁrms are almost equally likely to face default: 6.19%
for liquid ﬁr m sv e r s u s8 . 2 6 %f o ri l l i q u i dﬁrms.12 Even though liquid ﬁrms face default with a similar
probability as illiquid ﬁrms, this does not increase their own probability of default. Moreover, the
coeﬃcients on whether or not they faced default and on the amount they faced are both statistically
insigniﬁcant, while they are statistically signiﬁcant and positive in the case of illiquid ﬁrms. The
insigniﬁcance of these coeﬃcients could simply reﬂect the fact that in the sub-group of liquid ﬁrms
we observe too few defaults to obtain statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at all. This does not seem to be
the explanation, however, as the coeﬃcients on the control variables are still very precisely estimated.
Even though the ﬁnding that liquid ﬁrms do not default on trade credit due to illiquidity may seem
somewhat of a tautology, we think the results are interesting for two reasons. One, they are evidence that
illiquid ﬁrms are indeed credit constrained, because clearly even illiquid ﬁrms in the absence of credit
constraints could have obtained short term ﬁnancing from their bank. Second, the results show the
absorption of liquidity shocks by liquid ﬁrms, raising the possibility that liquid ﬁrms oﬀset the potential
negative eﬀects of the liquidity shocks they experience by injecting fresh cash into the trade credit
chain. It follows that non-credit constrained ﬁrms not only provide their customers with insurance
against liquidity shocks (liquidity insurance) but they also provide the whole system with liquidity
(liquidity provision).
[Insert table 3.2 about here]
12One could have expected liquid ﬁrms to be more likely to face default, as this may be the reason to hold a high share
of liquid assets in the ﬁrst place.
12In models 6a to 6c we report results separately for small, medium, and large ﬁrms. First we examine
the probabilities of defaulting and facing default for ﬁrms in the diﬀerent size categories, which are
again reported at the bottom of the table. Small ﬁrms default on trade credit due to illiquidity more
than four times as often as large ﬁrms (2.5% versus 0.6%). Medium size ﬁrms are also signiﬁcantly less
likely to default compared to small ﬁrms with an unconditional probability of 1.1%. In contrast, large
ﬁrms face defaults with a probability of 17.3% in any given quarter while small ﬁrms face default with
a probability of only 4.8%. Although large ﬁr m sf a c eal o tm o r ed e f a u l t st h i sd o e sn o ti n c r e a s et h e i r
probability to default: Both df ltf aced_dum1234it−1 and df ltf aced_amount1234it−1 are insigniﬁcant.
The opposite is true for small ﬁrms, where facing a default and facing a larger default signiﬁcantly
increases the probability of default. Hence, trade credit default chains exist, but only among small ﬁrms
(hypothesis 2).13
The third way to classify ﬁrms that are likely or unlikely to be credit constrained relates to the
ability of banks to pledge high quality corporate loans as collateral with the Banque de France in the
context of participating in the bi-weekly liquidity auctions conducted by the Eurosystem. The Banque
de France permits the pledging of loans to ﬁrms with a rating of higher than 3 as collateral,14 which
corresponds to a probability of default over a one year horizon of 0.1% (see European Central Bank,
2001 and Banque de France, 2005). Clearly, if the loans to ﬁrms below this threshold can be pledged as
collateral with the central bank, banks have no incentive to deny credit to these ﬁrms. We do not have
access to the rating itself and could therefore not precisely identify the ﬁrms whose loans are eligible
as collateral or not. However, we had access to the ex ante probabilities to go bankrupt at a three
year horizon, or score (score3yearsit−1), computed by the Banque de France. This score is not used
in Banque de France’s rating process but Bardos (1998) and Bardos et al. (2004) showed that it is a
good proxy for ﬁrm ﬁnancial health. In addition, ﬁrms whose loans are eligible have been shown to
have bankruptcy rates between 0.25% and 0.75% at a three year horizon (Banque de France, 2006b).
Hence, as an approximation, we based our classiﬁcation on the ex ante probability to go bankrupt at a
three year horizon and took the probability of 0.5% as threshold. In models 7a and 7b we report the
results for ﬁrms whose score3yearsit−1 variable takes on values above ("low quality") and below ("high
quality") 0.5% respectively. The results conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings: Firms without access to outside
ﬁnance are more likely to default on trade credit when faced with a liquidity shock in the form of trade
credit defaults, while ﬁr m sw i t ht h i sa c c e s sa r en o t .
In summary:15 When a credit constrained ﬁrm faces a liquidity shock, this shock is partly absorbed
and partly passed to the ﬁrm’s suppliers. In contrast, when a large, liquid ﬁrm with access to outside
ﬁnance ("deep pocket") faces default, it fully absorbs the shock. These ﬁndings suggest that (i) liquidity
is provided to defaulting customers through an extension of the maturity period of their trade credit;
(ii) large ﬁrms use their access to outside ﬁnance to inject liquidity into the system by both paying their
13Due to the non-linearity of the model, the high coeﬃcient of the defaults faced for medium size ﬁr m s( 3 8 . 5 7 )d o e sn o t
reﬂect a larger sensibility of medium ﬁrms to defaults. Table 3.4 indeed shows that the economic eﬀect of the amount of
defaults faced on the probability to default decreases monotonously with ﬁrm size.
14The Banque de France rating ranges from 9 (for ﬁrms that do not provide any balance sheet information) to 3++ (for
the best ﬁms).
15An alternative way of testing the liquidity provision mechanism would be to constrain the coeﬃcient of the control
variables to be the same across the various types of ﬁrms, to dummy out each type of ﬁrm, and to test the signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcients for each type. We checked that this would not change our results. In addition, the ﬁnding that defaults
have diﬀerent eﬀects (even when allowing diﬀerents eﬀects of the control variables) across ﬁrms’ types makes our results
stronger.
13trade credit on time and by extending the maturity period of their receivables, and (iii) trade credit
default chains are the channels through which liquidity is reallocated from deep pockets to small, credit
constrained ﬁrms. These ﬁndings strongly support hypotheses 2 and 3.
In addition, small and illiquid ﬁrms face defaults as well. Hence, all types of ﬁrms supply liquidity
insurance to their customers, even small and credit constrained ﬁrms. Credit constrained ﬁrms can
aﬀord insuring their customers, because they are themselves insured by their suppliers: Firms that are
defaulted upon may default on their suppliers, and so on. Hence, not only deep pockets insure their
customers, but only deep pockets are able to inject fresh liquidity into the system. In addition, by
extending the maturity period of their trade credit, suppliers do not only relax the ﬁnancial constraints
faced by their direct customers but also ultimately those faced by their customers’ customers and other
ﬁrms they may not have direct business relationships with.
Due to the non-linearity of the model the economic magnitude of the coeﬃcients in table 3.2 is
diﬃcult to interpret. Hence in table 3.3, we present the marginal elasticities to the control variables.
The marginal eﬀects are computed for the median ﬁrm of each sub-group. A 1% increase in assets
reduces the probability of defaulting by 0.29% for large ﬁrms and by 0.69% for small ﬁrms. Receivables
and payables have symmetric eﬀects, with elasticities around 0.5 for all categories of ﬁrms, except for
ﬁrms that have easy access to outside ﬁnance.16 The positive eﬀects of bank debt and overdrafts on the
probability to default is relatively small for all ﬁrms (although statistically signiﬁcant); However, to the
extent that ﬁrms can use bank debt to increase their cash holdings, bank debt might have a positive
eﬀect on the default probability through liquid assets. The impact of liquid assets is overall relatively
strong but varies across ﬁrms. While a 1% rise in the liquid assets to total assets ratio reduces the
probability to default of large ﬁrms by 0.12%, it decreases that of small ﬁrms by 0.7%. This is further
evidence for the presence of liquidity constraints in the data.
[Insert table 3.3 about here]
In table 3.4 we evaluate the eﬀect of facing default on the probability to default. We report the
probabilities of default of the various types of ﬁrms separately, and for various amounts of defaults faced
(median, 95th percentile, and 99th percentile of the sample considered). As expected, illiquid ﬁrms are
the most sensitive to adverse shocks. For instance, when the median illiquid ﬁrm faces default of an
amount that represents 0.03% of its total assets (which is the median default faced by illiquid ﬁrms) in
a quarter, then its probability to default next quarter increases from 2.08% to 2.44%. When it faces a
default equal to 2.59% of its total assets (99th percentile of the distribution of the defaults faced), then
its probability to default increases to 2.75%. We obtain similar results for the breakdown using the size
and score variables. Notably, small ﬁrms are more sensitive to shocks than medium ﬁrms, which are
more sensitive to shocks than large ﬁrms. Overall, facing a median liquidity shock raises the default
probability of credit constrained ﬁrms by around 15%. In contrast, facing default does not aﬀect the
probability of defaulting of large, liquid, or high quality ﬁrms.
16One explanation for this latter result is that ﬁrms with easy access to bank loans may not need to pledge their
receivables as collateral to obtain short term credit, hence implying that, for these ﬁrms, receivables are not used as a way
to raise cash.
14[Insert table 3.4 about here]
Finally, we are interested in whether the evidence is consistent with a symbiotic relationship between
supplier and customer as in Cuñat (2006) or an abusive one as in, say, Kiyotaki and Moore (2001)
(hypothesis 4). In order to examine this we checked whether suppliers continue to supply trade credit
to ﬁrms that defaulted in the past. Hence, we calculated the percentage of repeat defaulters on the
same supplier, given the customer defaulted due to illiquidity in the past. In order to avoid counting the
same default more than once, we imposed a time lag between the ﬁrst default and any further default
of one quarter.17 A repeat default on the same supplier occurs about 15% of the time in the dataset.
This means that suppliers, even after having faced a default due to illiquidity once in the past, again
extended trade credit to this very customer. Note that the ﬁgure of 15% measures the likelihood of
repeat defaults, not the likelihood of a continuing relationship after a default occurs per se. Hence,
the statistic signiﬁcantly understates the number of ongoing supplier customer relationships: We only
observe an ongoing relationship if there was indeed a further default. But there may very well be many
instances in which trade credit is continued to be supplied and no further default occurs. Overall, this
seems strong evidence in favour of hypothesis 4 and in favour of a symbiotic relationship among ﬁrms.
4 Discussion, further results and robustness
The aim of this section is to discuss the robustness of our ﬁndings and address a number of selected
issues.18 First, we examine the endogeneity of defaults faced by distinguishing between expected and
unexpected defaults faced. Second, we use a Tobit model to estimate the amount of default, rather than
the probability, which also enables us to assess the extent to which shocks are either passed along or
absorbed. Third, given the importance we assign to diﬀerentiating between diﬀerent reasons to default,
we present evidence that the reason for default appears to be truthful (i.e. neither "disagreements" nor
"omissions" hide illiquidity).
4.1 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity
So far we performed the econometric analysis with the notion that the extent to which ﬁrms face default
(and therefore face liquidity shocks) is exogenous. As shown in table 2.4, however, most of the defaults
faced are due to disagreement over the quality of the products delivered, which may have its origin
with the ﬁrm facing the default. For instance ﬁrms that experience problems in the production process,
resulting in poor quality goods, are more likely to face defaults due to disagreements. By the same
token, problems in the production process may be evidence that the ﬁrm is poorly managed overall and
therefore also more likely to default on its own trade credit. It follows that defaulting and facing default
may be the result of the same unobserved characteristic or inherent quality. If so, then the baseline
17This is necessary, because the data do not permit a unique identiﬁcation of speciﬁc bills. This implies that potentially
the same bill is defaulted upon repeatedly. In our data, 12% of the ﬁrms that default in a given quarter continue defaulting
on the same supplier for liquidity reasons in the next quarter. Of course this in itself shows some leniency on part of the
supplier as any default where the supplier takes the customer to court disappears from our dataset.
18Although we do not report the results, we also checked that all our results hold when one drops the extreme values
(i.e. the last percentile of the distribution) of the explanatory variables of the model as well as when one breaks down the
sample according to whether ﬁrms are listed or not.
15suﬀers from omitted variable bias.19 We examine two modiﬁcations to our baseline speciﬁcation, which
address the problem in complementary ways. The results are reported in table 4.1.
[Insert table 4.1 about here]
In model 8 we add to the baseline regression the logarithm of one plus the average amount of default
(divided by total assets) faced by the ﬁrm over the past year (df ltf aced_ amount1234it−2,3,4). In this
way we attempt to control for unobservable characteristics of the ﬁrm that would result in a higher
likelihood of simultaneously facing default and defaulting.20 We ﬁnd that facing higher past defaults on
average has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrms’ probability of default. In addition, however, the
coeﬃcient on defaults faced in the last quarter remains signiﬁcantly positive. Hence, while ﬁrm speciﬁc
eﬀects do in part seem to be at the root of seeing a higher probability of default if ﬁrms face higher
default, we continue to ﬁnd evidence that even controlling for this eﬀect adverse liquidity shocks are
passed along the trade credit chain through defaults.
Our second modiﬁcation to address the potential endogeneity problem consists of disentangling
the various motives of default by including the amount of defaults due to disagreement separately
(df ltf aced_ amount1it−1) into the speciﬁcation (see model 9). Hence, we test whether the estimated
trade credit default chains exist also if the defaults faced are due to other reasons besides disagreement.
The rationale for this modiﬁcation is that while defaults due to disagreements might be endogenous, this
seems unlikely for defaults due to ﬁnancial distress, especially controlling, as we do, for sector/quarter
eﬀects. We ﬁnd that even when controlling for defaults faced due to disagreement, the coeﬃcient on
defaults faced due to reasons other than disagreement continues to be positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
The two modiﬁcations to the baseline model share the feature that they can both be viewed as
distinguishing expected liquidity shocks from unexpected shocks. While imperfect, the average of past
defaults faced is a proxy for the defaults ﬁrms can reasonably expect to face. Similarly, defaults faced
due to disagreements over product quality are a proxy for expected defaults, to the extent that ﬁrms
presumably know when they delivered poor quality products and, therefore, when to expect a higher
rate of complaints. The fact that in model 8 the coeﬃcient on the proxy for expected liquidity shocks is
signiﬁcantly positive conﬁrms that intrinsically poor quality ﬁrms are indeed more likely to default. In
addition the ﬁnding that expected defaults have a signiﬁcantly weaker impact than unexpected defaults
is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms may take precautionary steps to mitigate the negative eﬀects of
defaults when they anticipate them.21
19We already showed in table 3.2 that there exists a relationship between defaults faced and made for a priori credit
constrained ﬁrms only, which can be taken as evidence against the endogeneity of defaults faced.
20While estimating model 8 we dropped 215,231 observations in the calculation of the average defaults over the past
year.
21For instance, the ﬁrms that expect to be hit by liquidity shocks may (to the extent feasible) retain more earnings
and accumulate more cash to deal with future shocks. This seems to be particularly the case as far as defaults due to
disagreements are concerned, as the latter do not have any eﬀect at all in model 9. This ﬁnding is in line with Wilner
(2000), who shows that suppliers may be less inclined to concessions when shocks are systematic.
164.2 Tobit Model
In the previous section we modelled the probability to default. We now turn to the continuous version of
our econometric model and estimate a Tobit model with the amount of default (divided by total assets)
df tmade_amount3it due to illiquidity in quarter t as the dependent variable. We use a Tobit model
because the dependent variable is truncated at zero. We include the same explanatory variables as in
our previous speciﬁcations. Table 4.2 shows that results are robust: Small and illiquid ﬁrms, or those
that have less access to outside ﬁnance, pass adverse liquidity shocks to their suppliers through trade
credit chains. The control variables reveal the exact same patterns as in the discrete choice model, both
in sign and econometric signiﬁcance. Liquid, large ﬁrms with easy access to outside ﬁnance absorb the
shocks and provide liquidity to credit constrained ﬁrms.
The continuous dependent variable permits some further insights into the relative magnitude of the
proportion of the shocks passed on or absorbed by diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. While small ﬁrms face 18.3%
of the aggregate amount of defaults in a quarter (reported at the bottom of table 4.2) and hold 13.8%
of aggregate payables (see table 2.3), they are responsible for 69.1% of the total amount of default. In
contrast, while large ﬁrms face most of the defaults (67.9% of the total) and hold 74.5% of payables
they are responsible of only 14.5% of the total amount of default. By the same token, the defaults
made by low quality ﬁr m sa r em o r et h a nf o u rt i m e sa sl a r g ei nt e r m so fa s s e t st h a nt h o s em a d eb y
high quality ﬁrms (2.1% of their assets against 0.5%), while both type of ﬁrms face similar amounts of
defaults relative to their assets.
[Insert table 4.2 about here]
Combining this information with the coeﬃcients from the Tobit model, we can calculate how much
of an initial shock is passed on in the form of defaults, how much is absorbed by the ﬁrm and the
amount that is passed on to diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. The estimates from model 6a’ suggest that small
ﬁrms pass 19.4% of their liquidity shocks to their suppliers.22 The suppliers are small 18.3% of the time
and medium or large 81.7% of the time. As a consequence, small ﬁrms pass 15.8% of their liquidity
shocks on to ﬁrms unlikely to be credit constrained (which will not default) and 3.5% on to ﬁrms, which
again may default on their suppliers. Taking the sum of the inﬁnite series, and assuming for the sake of
argument that all small ﬁrms have the same size, we would obtain that EUR80.6 of a EUR100 liquidity
shock that hits a small ﬁrm would be absorbed by the ﬁrm, EUR2.8 would be absorbed by other small
ﬁrms down the trade credit chain, and EUR16.6 by large ﬁrms.
We also re-estimated the models in which we attempt to disentangle expected from unexpected
defaults faced using the continuous dependent variable (table 4.3). We ﬁnd that small ﬁr m sp a s sa l o n g
a larger proportion of unexpected adverse liquidity shocks than expected liquidity shocks, namely up to
28.3% of the shock.
[Insert table 4.3 about here]
22As in the binary model, the fact that the coeﬃcient of the default dummy is not signiﬁcant in model 6b’ makes the
high pass-through coeﬃcient (0.656) for medium ﬁrms diﬃcult to interpret economically.
17These results stand in contrast to Kiyotaki and Moore’s (2001) contention that trade credit default
chains amplify the eﬀects of liquidity shocks in the economy. In their model, credit constrained ﬁrms
default on trade credit in order to avoid the liquidation of assets, which is assumed to be costly. Hence,
part of the initial liquidity shock is passed on to suppliers, who in turn have to liquidate some assets and
pass the remaining of the shocks onto their own suppliers and so on. As a consequence, the negative
eﬀect of the initial shock ampliﬁes as liquidation costs accumulate along the trade credit default chain.
Hence, the larger the share of the initial shock that ﬁrms absorb, the smaller the negative externality
they impose on to their suppliers, and the weaker the ampliﬁcation mechanism. The results presented
in this paper emphasize that the conclusions of Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) hold only in the absence of
ﬁrms with access to outside ﬁnance in the economy ("deep pockets"). We show that while trade credit
default chains exist, they tend to reduce the likelihood of ﬁrms having to liquidate assets. Instead, they
constitute a channel to allocate liquidity from deep pockets to credit constrained ﬁrms. Overall, our
results would suggest that the impact of Kiyotaki and Moore’s ampliﬁcation mechanism, while it may
exist, is relatively limited.23
4.3 Do "Disagreements" and "Omissions" Hide Financial Distress?
In the previous sections we assumed that the reason for default reported in our data set is in fact the
"true" reason. Of course, one could imagine that, for instance to maintain a good reputation with other
suppliers, ﬁrms may be inclined to claim that there was a disagreement on the product quality or simply
omit to endorse the bill, rather than acknowledge liquidity problems. In this section we examine this
question in more detail.
First recall that the reason for default is reported by the bank of the customer and not by the
customer himself. In our view, this makes truthful reporting of the reason more likely compared to the
case in which the ﬁrm itself would report the reason for default. In addition, the clear asymmetry of
the defaults across motives that we show in section 2 is a further piece of evidence that defaults due to
disagreement, omission, and ﬁnancial distress are delineated from one another.24
[Insert table 4.4 about here]
We further investigate the truthfulness of the reason for default by re-estimating our baseline model,
but instead of using the probability of default due to illiquidity as the dependent variable, we use the
probability of default due to disagreement (model 12) and the probability of default due to omission
(model 13). Comparing the results, which are reported in table 4.4, to model 2 (see table 3.1), we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Older and larger ﬁrms are more likely to default due to disagreement or omission
while they are less likely to default due to illiquidity. Firms with high shares of used credit lines in
their liabilities are less likely to default due to disagreement, while they are more likely to default due
to illiquidity. And ﬁnally, ﬁrms with poor credit quality as measured by the Banque de France’s credit
23Rough calculations (available from the authors upon request) would suggest that dead weight asset liquidation costs
of 20% could be oﬀset by the injection of new liquidity. This implies that as long as liquidation costs do not exceed 20%
of assets liquidated, trade credit default chains tend to dampen, rather than amplify shocks.
24In section 2 we showed that defaults faced due to disagreement are very concentrated while defaults made due to
disagreement are dispersed across ﬁrms. In contrast, defaults faced due to illiquidity are dispersed while defaults made
are concentrated. This could be taken as evidence that the reason is indeed reported truthfully.
18scoring variable are less likely to default due to disagreement and more likely to default due to illiquidity.
All of this is in line with the notion that mature ﬁrms are more likely to assert their rights with their
suppliers, resulting in a higher probability of default due to disagreement, but these ﬁrms are less likely
to face liquidity problems. Nevertheless, ﬁrms with little liquidity are also more likely to default for
reasons unrelated to ﬁnancial distress, which suggests that there may indeed exist a correlation between
poor product quality, overall poor (liquidity) management, and the probability of default. All of the
above supports our assumption that the reason for default is indeed reported truthfully.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Trade credit tends to be very expensive with implicit annual interest rates in excess of 40%. This has
sparked a large literature on why ﬁrms use trade credit despite its high cost. This paper provides strong
evidence in favour of the idea that trade credit is used to alleviate credit constraints (Petersen and
Rajan, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004 and others).25 Speciﬁcally, our results are strongly supportive
of Cuñat’s (2006) idea of ﬁrms insuring each other against liquidity shocks, especially since we are able
to document that suppliers continue to extend trade credit to ﬁrms that already defaulted on a payment
in the past. Although in our test we focus on trade credit defaults, we would argue that our results are
quite general and extend to any type of adverse shock to cash ﬂows (e.g. demand, price, production
shocks).
Speciﬁcally, using a unique data set for French ﬁrms we show that small, illiquid ﬁrms with little
access to outside ﬁnance pass liquidity shocks on to their suppliers by defaulting on trade credit. If the
supplier is also small and illiquid and cannot raise fresh funds on short notice, a substantial portion
of the shock is likely to be passed on further down the trade credit chain. Large liquid ﬁrms ("deep
pockets") with access to outside ﬁnance ultimately tend to absorb at least some of these shocks and
hence inject new liquidity into the system. In this way credit constrained ﬁrms avoid having to liquidate
assets as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001). Trade credit default chains can serve a useful role in allocating
liquidity to credit constrained ﬁrms.
The rich data set we use allows us to identify both the supplier, who extends the trade credit and
the customer who receives it. For both we have a detailed set of balance sheet information. Further,
the data set is representative of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector in France. The high number of ﬁrms
permits extensive controls for sector, time and regional shocks. The data used in the paper also permit
a clean identiﬁcation of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and allow us to estimate a direct link between
the liquidity shock faced by a ﬁrm and its probability of default on trade credit. In our econometric
25Do our results provide evidence in connection with other theories of trade credit? The answer is yes. We ﬁnd strong
evidence that trade credit may be an incentive mechanism that ensures that customers are delivered high quality products
(Lee and Stowe, 1993, Long et al., 1993, Deloof and Jegers, 1996). The prevalence of defaults due to disagreement in
our database amounting to more than 80 percent of total defaults, is consistent with the theory that suggests that ﬁrms
frequently use trade credit as a means to verify the quality of the goods that were delivered to them. Re-examining model
12 in table 4.4 presented in the previous section reveals patterns that further support his idea, as older, larger ﬁrms,
which can be expected to possess more bargaining power with respect to their suppliers, are signiﬁcantly more likely to
default on trade credit due to disagreement. Finally, the negative eﬀect of receivables on the default probability in table
3.1 could also be interpreted to provide some evidence against the notion that bad ﬁr m su s et h ee x t e n s i o no ft r a d ec r e d i t
as a marketing strategy for their goods (Summers and Wilson, 2003, Blazenko and Vandezande, 2003). In addition, if this
were the case then young and small ﬁrms would presumably accommodate more defaults than large or well established
ﬁrms. However, the results suggest the opposite.
19analysis we are able to take great care identifying trade credit default chains (a higher likelihood of
defaulting if facing defaults), and control for ﬁrms’ unobserved characteristics that would cause ﬁrms
to both face more defaults (due to e.g. poor product quality) and default more frequently (due to e.g.
poor cash management). We also view our paper as providing some fresh evidence on the existence of
credit constraints in the corporate sector.
Overall the paper points to the existence of symbiotic relationships between suppliers and their
customers, as described in Cuñat (2006) and similar to those between banks and ﬁrms ﬁrst described
in Petersen and Rajan (1995). Petersen and Rajan (1995), however, rely on the assumption of a
monopolistic banking system, which enables banks to collect rents from their customers. In this paper,
the beneﬁt appears to be mutual. Customers are willing to buy on credit even though the implicit
interest rate that is charged is higher than the credit market rate because they do not have access to the
credit market. Suppliers are willing to lend because they can threaten to stop the supply of customized
goods. They also have an incentive to ensure the survival of their customers and therefore are willing to
permit trade credit defaults. In our data, a signiﬁcant proportion of ﬁrms continue to extend trade credit
to a customer even after facing default due to illiquidity from the customer. A striking implication of
our results goes beyond this bilateral relationship, however. The presence of trade credit default chains
suggests that the supplier ultimately providing credit may not have any direct business relationship
with the ﬁrm that was initially hit by the shock. Instead the allocation of liquidity operates indirectly
through a chain of such relationships.
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Table 2.1: Number of observations
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1998-2003
N 53,329 326,709 348,278 360,350 368,516 373,483 1,830,665
Number of ﬁrms 28,355 84,614 92,506 97,163 99,492 100,763 121,060
Table 2.2: Summary statistics - balance sheets
mean median 1% 99% % strictly positive obs. [1]
Total assets (millions of euros) 13.9 2.2 0.5 165.8 100
Age (years) 22.4 17 2 91 100
Ratios in % of total assets
Bank debt 9.0 5.5 0.0 46.6 86.2
of which: overdrafts 2.9 0.0 0.0 28.5 53.9
Payables 23.6 21.0 1.7 67.0 99.98
Receivables 29.59 27.98 0.0 79.5 98.8
Net receivables 6.0 7.0 -46.1 53.2 98.7
Liquid assets 9.9 5.5 0.0 51.3 95.7
N=1,830,665. [1] Number of ﬁrm-quarter observations where the ratios are strictly positive, in percentage
of the total number of quarter-ﬁrm observations.
Table 2.3: Proportion of small, medium, and large ﬁrms
% share in aggregate
assets trade [1] receivables payables N % of N
small [2] 10.2 15.3 15.0 13.8 1,348,206 73.7
medium [3] 8.9 12.0 12.5 11.8 284,130 15.5
large [4] 80.8 72.9 72.5 74.5 198,329 10.8
Table 2.3 shows the share in totals aggregated over the full sample. [1] Trade is the sum of purchases and
sales. [2] Small ﬁrms deﬁned as total assets below EUR5 million. [3] Medium ﬁrms: between EUR5 and EUR15
million of total assets. [4] Large ﬁrms: more than EUR15 million of total assets.
23Table 2.4: Summary statistics - defaults
disagreement omission illiquidity insolvency any motive [1]
Avge amount of defaults made per ﬁrm/quarter 11,626 6,787 40,742 39,352 15,868
(in euros, given default)
N. obs with default 295,767 18,568 37,669 6,751 338,098
% obs with default 16.2 1.0 2.1 0.4 18.47
N. of defaults per ﬁrm/quarter (given default) 2.5 2.1 8.5 9.7 3.5
Total amount of default made (in billions euros) 3.44 0.13 1.53 0.27 5.36
Avge amount of defaults faced per ﬁrm/quarter 15,524 4,308 9,621 5,970 15,734
(in euros, given default)
N. obs with default 89,662 9,840 56,606 15,512 131,660
% obs with default 4.90 0.54 3.09 0.85 7.19
N. of defaults per ﬁrm/quarter (given default) 2.9 1.5 2.1 1.7 3.2
Total amount of default faced (in billions euros) 1.39 0.04 0.54 0.09 2.07
The average amounts of defaults are calculated over the full sample, conditional on observing defaults. [1]
The column any motive is not the sum of the other four columns, because ﬁrms default or are defaulted upon
several times and for several reasons in a given quarter.
Table 2.5: Default ratios [1], [2]
Ratios in % mean med 1% 99% Nb. obs % obs
Defaults made/total assets 0.47 0.04 0.00 7.86 338,098 18.47
due to illiquidity 2.12 0.97 0.00 15.00 37,669 2.06
Defaults made/payables 2.02 0.19 0.00 29.35 338,098 18.47
due to illiquidity 8.64 4.01 0.00 59.02 37,669 2.06
Defaults faced/total assets 0.19 0.03 0.00 2.59 131,660 7.19
Defaults faced/receivables 1.81 0.11 0.00 13.76 131,660 7.19
Defaults faced/liquid assets 43.66 0.95 0.00 762.25 127,544 6.97
Default faced/GOS 4.79 0.43 0.00 53.67 118,782 6.49
[1] We report quarterly amounts of default divided by annual balance sheet items in order to avoid double-
counting the successive defaults that may occur between a given ﬁrm and its supplier during the year. [2] Ratios
are conditional on observing defaults.
Table 2.6a: Distribution of defaults - Small ﬁrms
No default Default Total
due to illiquidity
Not defaulted upon 1,252,222 31,672 1,283,894
(no matter the reason) (97.5) (2.5) (95.2)
Defaulted upon 62,602 1,710 64,312
(no matter the reason) (97.3) (2.7) (4.8)
Total 1,314,824 33,382 1,348,206
(no matter the reason) (97.5) (2.5) (100)
24Table 2.6b: Distribution of defaults - Large ﬁrms
No default Default Total
due to illiquidity
Not defaulted upon 163,058 987 164,045
(no matter the reason) (99.4) (0.6) (82.7)
Defaulted upon 34,072 212 34,284
(no matter the reason) (99.4) (0.6) (17.3)
Total 197,130 1,199 198,329
(no matter the reason) (99.4) (0.6) (100)
Table 3.1: Logit estimation of the probability of default
Dependent variable Default due to illiquidity (df ltmade_dum3it)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables
Constant 1.86**
(0.279)
0.99**
(0.281)
1.02**
(0.282)
1.02**
(0.282)
ageit -0.02
(0.015)
-0.03*
(0.015)
-0.03
(0.015)
-0.02
(0.015)
assetit−1 -0.68**
(0.013)
-0.61**
(0.013)
-0.62**
(0.013)
-0.62**
(0.013)
purchaseit−1 0.05**
(0.015)
0.12**
(0.015)
0.12**
(0.015)
0.12**
(0.015)
salesit−1 -0.78**
(0.032)
-0.55**
(0.031)
-0.55**
(0.031)
-0.55**
(0.031)
liquid assetit−1 -12.79**
(0.238)
-11.18**
(0.233)
-11.18**
(0.233)
-11.17**
(0.233)
receivablesit−1 -2.34**
(0.099)
-2.10**
(0.097)
-2.14**
(0.097)
-2.14**
(0.097)
payablesit−1 4.96**
(0.105)
3.00**
(0.108)
3.00**
(0.108)
3.00**
(0.109)
bank debtit−1 0.98**
(0.145)
0.64**
(0.140)
0.65**
(0.139)
0.65**
(0.139)
overdraftit−1 6.76**
(0.170)
3.74**
(0.177)
3.74**
(0.177)
3.74**
(0.177)
listedi 0.43*
(0.177)
0.39*
(0.170)
0.39*
(0.170)
0.39*
(0.170)
score3yearsit−1 - 0.05**
(0.000)
0.05**
(0.000)
0.05**
(0.000)
df ltf aced_dum1234it−1 -- 0.15**
(0.033)
0.13**
(0.033)
df ltf aced_amount1234it−1 --- 5.76**
(1.463)
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19
Wald Statistic 16,536 22,789 22,819 22,837
Defaults made, %o fo b s 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Defaults faced, % of obs 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
N 1,830,665 1,830,665 1,830,665 1,830,665
The endogenous variable is the dummy df ltf aced_dum3it, which is equal to one if ﬁrm i defaults at least
once due to illiquidity in quarter t and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are the logarithm of the age (in
number of years) of ﬁrm i in quarter t (ageit), the logarithm of the assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t−1 (assetit−1),
the logarithm of the ratio purchases/assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (purchaseit−1), the logarithm of the
ratio sales/assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (salesit−1), the logarithm of one plus the ratio payables/assets of
ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (payablesit−1), the logarithm of the ratio receivables/assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1
(receivablesit−1), the logarithm of one plus the ratio total bank debt (including used credit lines)/assets of
ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (bank debtit−1), the logarithm of one plus the ratio used credit lines/assets of ﬁrm i
25in quarter t − 1 (overdraftit−1), the logarithm of one plus the ratio liquid assets (i.e. stock of cash + short
term marketable securities)/assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (liquid assetit−1), a dummy that is equal to one
if ﬁrm i has been listed on the French stock market once over the period 1998-2003 (listedi), the probability
that ﬁrm i goes bankrupt or defaults on a large fraction of its bank debt within the next three years after
quarter t − 1 (score3yearsit−1), a dummy equal to one if ﬁrm i faced default at least once in quarter t − 1
(df ltf aced_dum1234it−1) irrespective of the reason, and the logarithm of one plus the ratio total amount of
the defaults faced by ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (irrespective of the motive)/total assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1
(df ltf aced_amount1234it−1). All models also include 275 sector*quarter dummies and 22 regional dummies
(not reported). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering using the generalised method
based on Huber-White. **, * : signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 3.2: Logit estimation of the probability of default
Breakdown by liquid assets, asset size, and access to external ﬁnance
Dependent variable Default due to illiquidity: df ltmade_dum3it
(5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) (6c) (7a) (7b)
Independent variables illiquid liquid small medium large low quality high quality
Constant 1.33**
(0.295)
-3.16**
(1.029)
1.65**
(0.317)
-1.02
(1.414)
-6.65**
(1.270)
1.05**
(0.282)
-8.84**
(1.483)
ageit -0.01
(0.016)
-0.10**
(0.030)
-0.03
(0.016)
-0.01
(0.041)
0.03
(0.054)
-0.03*
(0.015)
0.12
(0.122)
assetit−1 -0.64**
(0.014)
-0.50**
(0.030)
-0.70**
(0.021)
-0.66**
(0.113)
-0.29**
(0.073)
-0.62**
(0.013)
-0.24**
(0.098)
purchaseit−1 0.13**
(0.017)
0.09**
(0.032)
0.14**
(0.017)
0.00
(0.039)
0.11*
(0.050)
0.12**
(0.015)
0.33*
(0.152)
salesit−1 -0.58**
(0.034)
-0.33**
(0.064)
-0.61**
(0.036)
-0.28**
(0.081)
-0.44**
(0.093)
-0.56**
(0.031)
-0.84**
(0.277)
liquid assetit−1 -15.99**
(0.771)
-6.04**
(0.320)
-11.53**
(0.250)
-9.42**
(0.830)
-4.76**
(0.915)
-11.26**
(0.242)
-3.31**
(0.798)
receivablesit−1 -2.09**
(0.106)
-2.12**
(0.196)
-2.09**
(0.103)
-2.40**
(0.365)
-2.45**
(0.522)
-2.14**
(0.097)
-0.11
(1.113)
payablesit−1 2.82**
(0.123)
3.58**
(0.202)
3.05**
(0.117)
2.98**
(0.378)
3.20**
(0.554)
2.95**
(0.109)
2.84*
(1.168)
bank debtit−1 0.70**
(0.153)
0.45
(0.278)
0.52**
(0.150)
1.60**
(0.477)
1.48**
(0.505)
0.59**
(0.141)
1.03
(0.850)
overdraftit−1 3.21**
(0.194)
5.02**
(0.372)
3.97**
(0.195)
2.59**
(0.544)
2.61**
(0.679)
3.74**
(0.178)
9.88**
(2.510)
listedi 0.34
(0.194)
0.64*
(0.325)
-0.18
(0.448)
0.17
(0.376)
0.29
(0.22)
0.36*
(0.174)
0.94
(0.808)
score3yearsit−1 0.05**
(0.000)
0.06**
(0.002)
0.05**
(0.000)
0.05**
(0.002)
0.04**
(0.003)
0.05**
(0.000)
0.52
(1.129)
df ltf aced_dum1234it−1 0.16**
(0.036)
-0.02
(0.075)
0.12**
(0.038)
0.14
(0.083)
0.18
(0.105)
0.13**
(0.033)
-0.25
(0.345)
df ltf aced_amount1234it−1 6.09**
(1.853)
2.98
(3.597)
5.02**
(1.404)
38.57*
(18.050)
4.72
(4.367)
5.76**
(1.463)
23.87
(22.848)
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.13
Wald Statistic 14,572 6,320 19,626 3,743 1,627 21,967 551
Defaults made, % of obs 3.58 0.63 2.48 1.09 0.60 2.21 0.22
Defaults faced, % of obs 8.26 6.19 4.77 11.68 17.26 7.35 5.28
N 885,800 944,865 1,348,206 284,130 198,329 1,692,773 137,892
The endogenous variable is df ltf aced_dum3it, which is equal to one if ﬁrm i defaults at least once due
to illiquidity in quarter t and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are deﬁned as in 3.1 Models 5a,b are
estimated on the subsamples of ﬁrms whose liquid assets to total assets ratio is below ("illiquid") and above
("liquid") the median of the sample, see table 2.2). Models 6a,b,c are estimated on the subsamples of small,
medium, and large ﬁrms, as deﬁned in table 2.3. Model 7a,b are estimated on the subsamples ﬁrms whose
probability to go bankrupt within the next three years in quarter t − 1 (score3yearsit−1) are above ("low
quality") or below ("high quality") 0.5%, respectively. Models 5a, 6a, and 7a also include 275 sector*quarter
dummies and 22 regional dummies (not reported). Model 5b includes 269 sector*quarter dummies and 22
regional dummies (not reported). Model 6b includes 265 sector*quarter dummies and 22 regional dummies (not
26reported). Model 6c includes 225 sector*quarter dummies and 22 regional dummies (not reported). Model 7b
includes 113 sector*quarter dummies and 22 regional dummies (not reported). Standard errors adjusted for
clustering using the generalized method based on Huber-White in parenthesis. The statistics on the defaults
made/faced (in % of obs) at the bottom of the table corresponds to the number of ﬁrm/quarter observations
where a default is observed in percentage of the total number of observations in the considered subsample. **,
*:s i g n i ﬁcant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Table 3.3: Marginal elasticities (models 5a,b, 6a,b,c and 7a,b)
in % illiquid liquid small medium large low quality high quality
ageit -0.01
(2.89)
-0.10**
(2.89)
-0.03
(2.83)
-0.01
(3.13)
0.03
(3.25)
-0.03*
(2.89)
0.12
(3.09)
assetit−1 -0.62**
(7.82)
-0.50**
(7.60)
-0.69**
(7.36)
-0.66**
(8.89)
-0.29**
(10.26)
-0.61**
(7.67)
-0.24**
(7.95)
purchaseit−1 0.13**
(-0.59)
0.09**
(-0.57)
0.14**
(-0.55)
0.00
(-0.60)
0.11*
(-0.76)
0.12**
(-0.53)
0.39*
(-1.30)
salesit−1 -0.57**
(0.38)
-0.33**
(0.44)
-0.61**
(0.47)
-0.29**
(0.26)
-0.44**
(0.06)
-0.56**
(0.44)
-0.85**
(-0.02)
liquid assetit−1 -0.18**
(0.01)
-0.79**
(0.13)
-0.70**
(0.06)
-0.42**
(0.04)
-0.12**
(0.02)
-0.53**
(0.05)
-0.58**
(0.17)
receivablesit−1 -0.53**
(0.25)
-0.50**
(0.23)
-0.53**
(0.25)
-0.56**
(0.23)
-0.51**
(0.21)
-0.55**
(0.26)
-0.01
(0.13)
payablesit−1 0.55**
(0.19)
0.65**
(0.18)
0.59**
(0.19)
0.57**
(0.19)
0.50**
(0.15)
0.58**
(0.20)
0.22*
(0.08)
bank debtit−1 0.05**
(0.08)
0.01
(0.03)
0.02**
(0.05)
0.08**
(0.05)
0.05**
(0.03)
0.03**
(0.05)
0.01
(0.01)
overdraftit−1 0.05**
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
listedi -0.008
(0)
0.000*
(0)
-0.002
(0)
0.000
(0)
0.000
(0)
0.000*
(0)
0.000
(0)
Table 3.3 shows the elasticities of the probability to default of ﬁrm i in quarter t to the control variables in
the models in table 3.2. Estimated at median values (in parenthesis) of the considered subsamples.
Table 3.4: Economic size of trade credit default chains: default probabilities
in %, median ﬁrm illiquid liquid small medium large low quality high quality
No default faced 2.08 0.03 1.10 0.07 0.00 1.14 0.00
Default faced - median 2.44**
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
1.28**
(0.02)
0.09
(0.02)
0.00
(0.01)
1.30**
(0.03)
0.00
(0.03)
Default faced - 95th pctile 2.53**
(0.76)
0.03
(0.79)
1.31**
(1.27)
0.09*
(0.43)
0.00
(0.20)
1.35**
(0.79)
0.00
(0.60)
Default faced - 99th pctile 2.75**
(2.59)
0.03
(2.60)
1.45**
(3.81)
0.11*
(1.26)
0.00
(0.61)
1.47**
(2.63)
0.00
(2.05)
The probabilities of default when the median ﬁrm does not face default in quarter t −1 are reported in the
ﬁrst line for each subsample. Calculated using the estimates of models 5a,b, 6a,b,c, and 7a,b at the median of
the subsamples. The next three lines show the default probabilities of the median ﬁrm when it faces defaults in
quarter t − 1 and when these defaults are median, high (95th percentile), and very high (99th percentile). The
median, 95th percentile and 99th percentile of the defaults faced (in percentage of total assets), respectively, are
reported into parentheses.
27Table 4.1: Logit - Controlling for endogeneity
Dependent variable Default due to illiquidity: df ltmade_dum3it
(8) (9)
Independent variables (average past defaults) (defaults breakdown)
Constant 0.68*
(0.343)
1.02**
(0.282)
ageit -0.03**
(0.016)
-0.02*
(0.015)
assetit−1 -0.61**
(0.014)
-0.62**
(0.013)
purchaseit−1 0.13**
(0.018)
0.12**
(0.015)
salesit−1 -0.59**
(0.035)
-0.55**
(0.031)
liquid assetit−1 -11.18**
(0.250)
-11.17**
(0.233)
receivablesit−1 -2.22**
(0.105)
-2.14**
(0.097)
payablesit−1 3.08**
(0.117)
3.00**
(0.108)
bank debtit−1 0.81**
(0.153)
0.65**
(0.139)
overdraftit−1 3.73**
(0.193)
3.74**
(0.177)
listedi 0.41*
(0.174)
0.39*
(0.170)
score3yearsit−1 0.05**
(0.000)
0.05**
(0.000)
df ltf aced_dum1234it−1 0.14**
(0.034)
0.12**
(0.033)
df ltf aced_amount1234it−1 6.49**
(1.739)
10.65**
(3.038)
df ltf aced_amount1234it−2,3,4 4.29**
(1.464)
-
df ltf aced_amount1it−1 - -5.99
(3.350)
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19
Wald Statistic 20,341 22,843
Defaults made, % of obs 1.95 2.06
Defaults faced, % of obs 3.31 7.19
N 1,615,434 1,830,665
The dependent and explanatory variables are deﬁned as before, except: Model 8 includes the average of the
logarithm of one plus the ratio total amount of the defaults faced by ﬁrm i (irrespective of the motive)/total
assets of ﬁrm i over quarters t − 2, t − 3 and t − 4 (df ltf aced_amount1234it−2,3,4). Model 9 includes the
logarithm of one plus the ratio total amount of the defaults faced by ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (when the default
is due to disagreement only)/total assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (df ltf aced_amount1it−1). Models 8 also
includes 239 sector*quarter dummies and 22 regional dummies and model 9 275 sector*quarter dummies and 22
regional dummies (not reported). Standard errors adjusted for clustering using the generalized method based
on Huber-White reported in parentheses. The statistics on the defaults made/faced (in % of obs) at the bottom
of the table corresponds to the number of ﬁrm/quarter observations where a default is observed in percentage
of the total number of observations. **, * : signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% respectively.
28Table 4.2: Tobit on the amount of default due to illiquidity
Dependent variable Log amount of defaults made: df tmade_amount3it
(5a0)( 5 b 0)( 6 a 0)( 6 b 0)( 6 c 0)( 7 a 0)( 7 b 0)
Independent variables illiquid liquid small medium large low quality high quality
Constant 0.01
(0.01)
-0.10**
(0.02)
0.03**
(0.008)
-0.02
(0.01)
-0.07**
(0.01)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.08**
(0.01)
ageit -0.001**
(0.00)
-0.003**
(0.00)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.000
(0.00)
-0.001**
(0.00)
-0.002**
(0.000)
assetit−1 -0.02**
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.019**
(0.000)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.002**
(0.000)
-0.02**
(0.00)
-0.002**
(0.000)
purchaseit−1 0.003**
(0.000
0.002**
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.000)
0.00
(0.00)
0.001**
(0.00)
0.003**
(0.00)
0.002**
(0.001)
salesit−1 -0.01**
(0.01)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.000)
-0.004**
(0.00)
-0.004**
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.001)
liquid assetit−1 -0.38**
(0.01)
-0.12**
(0.004)
-0.24**
(0.003)
-0.10**
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.004)
-0.23**
(0.003)
-0.02**
(0.01)
receivablesit−1 -0.05**
(0.001)
-0.05**
(0.002)
-0.06**
(0.001)
-0.03**
(0.002)
-0.02**
(0.003)
-0.05**
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.01)
payablesit−1 0.08**
(0.001)
0.09**
(0.20)
0.09**
(0.001)
0.04**
(0.002)
0.03**
(0.003)
0.08**
(0.001)
0.02*
(0.01)
bank debtit−1 0.02**
(0.002)
0.01
(0.004)
0.01**
(0.002)
0.02**
(0.003)
0.01**
(0.004)
0.01**
(0.001)
0.01
(0.01)
overdraftit−1 0.09**
(0.002)
0.13**
(0.01)
0.12**
(0.003)
0.04**
(0.004)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.11**
(0.002)
0.11**
(0.02)
listedi 0.01*
(0.003)
0.02**
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.01)
0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.001)
0.01**
(0.001)
0.007
(0.004)
score3yearsit−1 0.001**
(0.00)
0.001**
(0.00)
0.001**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.003
(0.01)
df ltf aced_dum1234it−1 0.003**
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.00)
0.001
(0.00)
0.001*
(0.00)
0.002**
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.003)
df ltf aced_amount1234it−1 0.23**
(0.04)
0.09
(0.11)
0.19**
(0.04)
0.66**
(0.11)
0.06
(0.10)
0.21**
(0.04)
0.22
(0.26)
Pseudo R2 0.43 0.28 0.46 0.42 0.30 0.45 0.32
Wald Statistic 42,619 10,578 61,210 5,509 1,631 68,701 576
Defaults made
in % of aggregate amounts 86.3 13.7 69.1 16.4 14.5 99.7 0.3
in % of assets (given default) 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.1 0.6 2.1 0.5
Defaults faced
in % of aggregate amounts 67.7 32.3 18.3 13.8 67.9 96.89 3.1
in % of assets (given default) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
N 885,800 944,865 1,348,206 284,130 198,329 1692,773 137,892
The endogenous variable is the logarithm of one plus the ratio total amount of the defaults made by ﬁrm i in quar-
ter t when the default is due to illiquidity divided by total assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t (df tmade_amount3it).
All models include sectoral and regional dummies, as before. The statistics on the defaults made/faced (in %
of amounts) at the bottom of the table corresponds to the share of the total amount of defaults made/faced by
ﬁrms in each subsample with respect to the total amount of defaults made/faced in our whole data set (in %).
Standard errors corrected for clustering using Huber/White are in parentheses. **, * : signiﬁcant at 1% and 5%
respectively.
29Table 4.3: Tobit on the amount of default due to illiquidity
Dependent variable Log amount of defaults made: df tmade_amount3it
Small ﬁrms
(10) (11)
Independent variables (average past defaults) (defaults breakdown)
Constant 0.010
(0.009)
0.025**
(0.008)
ageit -0.001**
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
assetit−1 -0.018**
(0.000)
-0.019**
(0.000)
purchaseit−1 0.004**
(0.000
0.004**
(0.000
salesit−1 -0.015**
(0.000)
-0.015**
(0.000)
liquid assetit−1 -0.236**
(0.003)
0.244**
(0.003)
receivablesit−1 -0.057**
(0.001)
-0.056**
(0.001)
payablesit−1 0.087**
(0.001)
0.089**
(0.001)
bank debtit−1 0.015**
(0.002)
0.012**
(0.002)
overdraftit−1 0.118**
(0.003)
0.122**
(0.003)
listedi -0.000
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)
score3yearsit−1 0.001**
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.007)
df ltf aced _dum1234it−1 0.002**
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.000)
df ltf aced _amount1234it−1 0.215**
(0.047)
0.283**
(0.086)
df ltf aced _amount1234it−2,3,4 0.109**
(0.037)
-
df ltf aced _amount1it−1 - -0.116
(0.099)
Pseudo R2 0.47 0.46
Wald Statistic 51,573 61,212
N 1,166,189 1,348,206
The endogenous variable is the logarithm of one plus the ratio total amount of the defaults made by ﬁrm i in quar-
ter t when the default is due to illiquidity only divided by total assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t (df tmade_amount3it).
The explanatory variables are deﬁned as before. In addition, model 10 includes the average of the logarithm of
one plus the ratio total amount of the defaults faced by ﬁrm i (irrespective of the motive) divided by total assets
of ﬁrm i over quarters t−2, t−3 and t−4 (df ltf aced_amount1234it−2,3,4). Model 10 includes the logarithm
of one plus the ratio total amount of the defaults faced by ﬁrm i in quarter t − 1 (when the default is due to
disagreement only) divided by total assets of ﬁrm i in quarter t−1 (df ltf aced_amount1it−1). Sector*quarter
and regional dummies are included (not reported). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, * : signiﬁcant
at 1% and 5% respectively.
30Table 4.4: Logit - Does disagreement hide ﬁnancial distress?
Defaults due to:
Dependent variables disagreement omission
df tmade_dum1it df tmade_dum2it
Independent variables (12) (13)
Constant -6.09**
(0.158)
-6.76**
(0.514)
ageit 0.15**
(0.007)
-0.02
(0.015)
assetit−1 0.31**
(0.004)
0.18**
(0.012)
purchaseit−1 0.12**
(0.007)
0.01
(0.015)
salesit−1 -0.14**
(0.014)
-0.05
(0.032)
liquid assetit−1 -0.53**
(0.054)
-1.39**
(0.139)
receivablesit−1 -0.29**
(0.045)
-0.64**
(0.105)
payablesit−1 1.49**
(0.051)
0.98**
(0.114)
bank debtit−1 0.45**
(0.066)
0.13
(0.151)
overdraftit−1 -0.56**
(0.102)
0.72**
(0.211)
listedi 0.03
(0.069)
0.18
(0.138)
score3yearsit−1 -0.00**
(0.000)
0.03**
(0.001)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.04
Wald Statistic 23,934 5,407
N 1,830,665 1,830,665
In model 12, the endogenous variable is the dummy df ltf aced_dum1it, which is equal to one if ﬁrm i
defaults at least once due to disagreement in quarter t and zero otherwise. In model 13, the endogenous variable
is the dummy df ltf aced_dum2it, which is equal to one if ﬁrm i defaults at least once due to an omission in
quarter t and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are the deﬁned as before. Both models also include
sector*quarter and regional dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
clustering using the generalised method based on Huber-White. **, * : signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% respectively.
31Appendix
This appendix describes the initial datasets that we use to compile the working data and provides
more detailed information on the merger process.
A1. Balance Sheet Data
The balance sheet database "FIBEN" contains unconsolidated balance sheet information about
closely-held and incorporated businesses that operated in France over the period 1998-2003. The FIBEN
database includes ﬁrms whose turnover exceeds EUR750,000 or with bank loans above EUR38,000. It
covers about 300,000 ﬁrms over the period 1998-2003, with an average of 200,000 businesses per year
(see tables A1.1), which represents more than 80% of all ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n2 0e m p l o y e e s( s e ea l s o
Banque de France, 2006a). For ﬁrms with less than 20 employees the coverage is about 50%. The
quality of the data is high because the Banque de France uses them to rate French ﬁrms and checks, for
medium and large ﬁrms, whether these data tally with information gathered in the ﬁeld.26
Table A1.1: Balance Sheet Data
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 all
Nb. of ﬁrms (thds) 187.5 191.9 195.0 201.4 205.5 208.9 299.3
A2. CIPE Data
A2.1. The Data Collection Process of Trade Credit Defaults
T h eT y p i c a lT r a d eD e a l . Consider a ﬁrm A (the "customer") that buys on credit some goods
from a ﬁrm B (the "supplier"), with terms of 2-10 net 30. This means that A has to pay within 30 days.
In addition, a cash discount of 2% from the stated sales price is to be given if payment is made within
10 days. In eﬀect, supplier B draws a bill of exchange on its customer A, stipulating the names of A and
B’s banks, A and B’s bank account numbers, and the terms of the sale. In order to be paid, ﬁrm B is
obliged, by law, to send to its bank the information related to this claim at least one week before the due
date of payment. Once B’s bank has received the information, the latter is instantaneously transmitted
to A’s bank through the French interbank clearing system (the so-called SIT system). A’s bank thereby
continuously gathers all information related to the bills of exchange that A issues. In order for A to
check the features of the bills of exchange, A’s bank sends to A, on a regular (usually weekly) basis,
statements that take stock of all trade debts falling due. Following such statements, A must endorse or
repudiate the bills. Typically, a bill is repudiated when there is a disagreement about the terms (e.g. on
the price, the due date of payment, etc.); The bill will not be paid at the due date of payment, implying
that ﬁrms A and B will have to either settle a new deal (B will then draw a new bill on A), or go to
Court. On the contrary, if ﬁrm A endorses the bill, then the payment will in general be processed at the
due date of payment, unless ﬁrm A has ﬁnancial problems and is unable to pay. In such case, the two
ﬁrms reach a new agreement and B draws a new bill on A with a later date of payment and possibly
penalties, or ﬁrm B takes legal action. In some cases, it may also happen that a trade debtor simply
omits to endorse/repudiate a bill. In the absence of payment order, his bank will not proceed to the
payment at the due date and the trade creditor will have to send a reminder. In practice, reminders are
26Staﬀ from Banque de France’s subsidiaries may meet medium and large ﬁrms’ managers to check balance sheets and
gather soft information about the ﬁrms.
32sent during the subsequent 2-3 weeks after the payment has become late. Although in France suppliers
usually do not charge for reminders, they may however in few cases (about 15% of the cases) charge
additional interest on late payments (Intrum Justitia, 2004a). The penalty rate is usually 1.5 times the
European Central Bank’s main reﬁnancing rate.27 When amicable collection is not possible, suppliers
may sue their customers. According to World Bank (2004) estimates it takes on average 7 months to
have the contract enforced through the legal system and costs about 7.6% of the amount of the trade
bill. In the case where customers ﬁle for bankruptcy, suppliers have to wait longer, that is about 2.4
years in order to get on average 36% of their money back.28 In the case a customer cannot pay on time,
or repudiates, its trade bill, then its bank is obliged, by law, to notify the default to the Banque de
France at the latest four working days after the due date of payment. These data are collected by the
Banque de France via the SIT system and then recorded into the CIPE database.
The French Interbank Teleclearing System (SIT). In France, bills of exchange have been com-
puterized since in 1994 in order to accelerate and secure trade debt payments. The former paper bills
have all been replaced by electronic bills, whose payments are now operated through banks by using
the automatized clearing system SIT. All resident credit institutions that manage retail payment trans-
actions are required to participate in the SIT, which processes the transactions between participants.
The exchange of payments is continuous and operated directly between banks’ IT centres. At the bank
level, multilateral netting takes place via an accounting centre and net balances are settled through the
Banque de France’s gross settlement system. The SIT system is the largest retail payment system in
Europe. With 106 million of transactions in 2004 worth a total of EUR430 billions (i.e. 26% of GDP),
bills of exchange represent 1% of the volume (9% in value) of the transactions processed by the SIT.29
A2.2. The Data
The CIPE database contains information related to all defaults on trade credit of all private non-
ﬁnancial businesses that operated in France over the period 1998-2003. CIPE includes ﬁve variables:
the SIREN number of the defaulter (which is the ﬁrm’s identiﬁcation number), the due date of payment,
the amount of default, the name of the supplier that has been defaulted upon, and the motive for the
default (disagreement, omission, illiquidity, or insolvency).
27On 8 August 2000, the Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating late
payment in commercial transactions was published. The Directive entered into force on 8 August 2002 and is now
applicable in all EU25 member States (with the exception of Spain). It imposes a ﬁxed payment term of 30 days unless
otherwise contractually agreed, the legal interest rate on overdue payments (which amounts to the European Central
Bank rate plus 7% per year), as well as the recovery costs. As the Directive has been transposed in France only recently,
companies still use diﬀerent interest rates.
28The 2004 survey by Intrum Justitia (2004b) also reveals that the average maturity of trade debts in France is about
52.3 days, while late payments are of about 14.1 days.
29The bulk of the transactions processed by the SIT are related to the other mass payment instruments, namely, cheques,
credit transfers, direct debit, ATM withdrawals, credit and debit card payments. Note that about 23 other millions of bills
of exchange were also processed outside the SIT in 2004, which corresponded to situations where both the issuers and the
receivers of the claims had their bank account in the same bank, which then in general directly processed the payment at
its level ("intrabank" clearing). In these cases, defaults are however also reported to the Banque de France and recorded
into CIPE.
33Table A2.1: Defaults in CIPE
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 all
Nb. of defaults (millions) 1.90 1.79 1.71 1.72 1.63 1.54 10.3
Avg. amount of default (euros) 2,082 2,261 2,534 2,712 2,690 2,877 2,509
Nb of defaulting ﬁrms (thds) 306.6 303.9 305.8 310.7 304.3 301.2 805.9
Nb of suppliers defaulted upon (thds) [1] 175.1 165.1 154.1 154.6 144.0 137.1 454.8
Nb. of defaults with identiﬁed suppliers (millions) 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.76 4.85
Avg. amount of default with identiﬁed suppliers (euros) 2,032 2,306 2,643 2,614 2,556 2,652 2,464
Nb of identiﬁed suppliers defaulted upon (thds) 42.7 43.1 43.3 44.5 42.2 41.0 82.0
[1] The number of suppliers defaulted upon is approximated by the number of diﬀerent suppliers’ names in CIPE.
This is an approximation for we counted several times the same supplier when its name was misspelled several
times, while we counted homonym ﬁrms only once.
There are about 10.3 million defaults recorded in CIPE, with an average amount of EUR2,509
(see table A2.1). While 805,900 ﬁrms defaulted at least once over the period, 454,800 faced default.30
The quality of the data is very high regarding all variables (in particular, we know the identity of all
defaulters) except for the identity of suppliers. For the ﬁrms defaulted upon, only names are available.
To identify the suppliers, we matched their names as reported in CIPE with the names and SIREN
numbers of the ﬁrms present in the balance sheet database. In about 53% of the cases, the name of the
ﬁrm defaulted upon in CIPE did not correspond to any SIREN number in the balance sheet database,
either because it was mispelled or because the ﬁrm was not present in the balance sheet database —
especially as far as micro ﬁrms are concerned. In 44% of the cases, we could match the name of the
supplier in CIPE with one unique ﬁrm (or SIREN number) in the balance sheet database. Finally,
suppliers’ names corresponded to several diﬀerent homonym ﬁrms in the balance sheet database for 3%
of the defaults. In thoses cases, we assumed that the supplier defaulted upon was the largest of the
homonym ﬁrms (i.e. with the largest total assets).31 This way we could identify 82 thousand suppliers
for a total of 4.85 million defaults. We checked whether the identiﬁed defaults faced diﬀered from those
not identiﬁed in some observable manner, but we found no evidence of this. In particular, the average
amount of defaults faced by the identiﬁed suppliers over the sample period is almost the same as the
average amount of default (EUR2,464 against EUR2,509). Hence we assumed the missing supplier
identiﬁcation to be random. For further evidence of this, we checked that we are as likely to identify
the suppliers for any of the four main reasons: The distribution of the reasons given for defaults is the
same for the defaults where we identify the suppliers as for the defaults where we do not.
A3. Matching of CIPE and balance sheet data
Our data set is a quarterly panel built from the CIPE and the balance sheet data. To construct this
panel, we proceeded in three steps. First, we excluded from our data set ﬁrms without balance sheet,
ﬁrms in agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, real estate activities, and education, health and social work, as
well as the public sector and ﬁnancial and insurance ﬁrms. We also dropped all micro-ﬁrms with less
than EUR500,000 of assets or less than 10 employees as well as all ﬁrm-quarter observations for which
30We explain the gap between these two ﬁgures in section 2 in the text, by the fact that most defaults are due to
disagreement and that this type of default hits customers and suppliers in an asymmetric manner.
31Since large ﬁrms with large receivables are the most likely to face defaults, this assumption is the least likely to
introduce measurement errors on defaults faced.
34our main explanatory variables (i.e. assets, purchases, sales, accounts payable and receivable) were
missing or inconsistent (e.g. total debt larger than total assets). Second, we summarized for each ﬁrm
and each quarter the information in CIPE by transforming daily into quarterly data. For the defaults
made, we created dummies equal to one for ﬁrm i in quarter t if ﬁrm i defaulted at least once during
quarter t, and calculated the total amount and the total number of defaults made by ﬁrm i in quarter
t, broken down by the reason for default. Note that to compute these statistics we used all the defaults
made to all ﬁrms, including those made to non-identiﬁed suppliers or more generally to ﬁrms out of our
sample. We generated equivalent variables for the defaults faced by the ﬁr m si no u rs a m p l e . I nt h i s
case, however, we computed the statistics by using the defaults faced that originated from the ﬁrms
present in our sample only. In particular, we excluded defaults made by micro-ﬁr m s ,w h i c ht e n dt ob e
extremely small.
In a third step, we matched the transformed CIPE data of every ﬁrm i and quarter t with the
corresponding balance sheet data. When ﬁrm i did not default in quarter t (i.e. the ﬁrm is not present
in CIPE in quarter t), we assigned the value 0 to the CIPE variables (e.g. for the amount of default)
and kept its balance sheet information in the database. Since balance sheet data are available at annual
frequency only, we assigned to ﬁrm i in quarter t its most recent balance sheet available between quarters
t−5 and t, and dropped the information from CIPE when the most recent balance sheet was more than
ﬁve quarters old. Note that this matching strategy implies that the same balance sheet information is
assigned to ﬁrm i between quarters t−j and t when ﬁrm i last released its balance sheet in quarter t−j
(for j 6 5). As we will use the lags of the explanatory variables in our regressions, we also dropped, for
every quarter, the ﬁrms that were not present in the panel in the previous quarter. For the number of
ﬁrms present in our data set at each step of its construction consider table A3.1. Ultimately, our data
set includes 121,060 ﬁrms over the period 1998-2003. More than 75% of the ﬁrms defaulted at least
once over the period 1998-2003, while almost 25% of the ﬁrms have been defaulted upon at least once.
Table A3.1: Number of ﬁrms in the data set (period 1998-2003)
thousands of ﬁrms with... default made no default made default faced no default faced Total
in the whole economy 805.9 1,656.1 454.8 [2] 2,007.2 2,462 [1]
in CIPE 805.9 0 454.8 [2] 0 -
in CIPE with available SIREN 805.9 0 82.0 0 829.6
in the balance sheet database [2] 169.4 134.9 82.0
[95.6]
217.3
[203.7]
299.3
... non-micro ﬁrms and sectors of interest 111.0 46.1 54.8 102.3 157.1
... with consistent balance sheets [3] 100.4 32.0 49.6 82.8 132.4
... present in 2 consecutive quarters 94.0 27.0 46.7 74.3 121.0
in our data set 94.0 27.0 29.0 [4] 92.0 [4] 121.0
[1] Total number of businesses in the French economy over the period 1998-2003. (Source: INSEE, www.insee.fr).
There are about 2.4 million businesses in France, out of which 805.9 thousand defaulted at least once and
1.6 million never defaulted over the period 1998-2003. Initially we observe balance sheets for 169.4 thousand
defaulting ﬁr m sa n df o r8 2t h o u s a n dﬁrm facing defaults. After dropping micro ﬁrms, ﬁrms with inconsistent
balance sheets, and ﬁrms that are not present in our data set in two consecutive quarters, we are left with 121
thousand ﬁrms. [2] The number of suppliers defaulted upon in the whole economy and in CIPE is approximated
by the number of diﬀerent suppliers’ names in CIPE. This is an approximation for we counted several times the
same supplier when its name was misspelled several times, while we counted homonym ﬁrms only once. [2] The
35ﬁgures into brackets refer to the numbers of ﬁrms once we account for the fact that we did not identify all the
ﬁrms that faced defaults. We corrected the initial ﬁgures by using the ratio of the number of ﬁrms that defaulted
and the number of ﬁrms that faced defaults in the whole economy (where there are 454,800 ﬁr m sf a c i n gd e f a u l t
for 805,900 ﬁrms defaulting). Under the assumption that this ratio is the same for ﬁrms with balance sheets as
for all ﬁrms in the economy, there should be 1.77 times less ﬁr m sf a c i n gd e f a u l t st h a nﬁr m sd e f a u l t i n gi nt h e
balance sheet database, that is to say about 95,600 ﬁrms defaulted upon. [4] In our ﬁnal data set we do not
consider as liquidity shocks the defaults faced that originated from ﬁrms that do not belong to our data set.
While 46,700 ﬁrms faced at least one default over the period 1998-2003, only 29,000 were defaulted upon by
ﬁrms present in our data set. [3] As mentioned in the text, the quality of the balance sheet data is very high
and in most cases the "inconsistencies" were due to missing values.
Our data set ﬁnally includes 94,000 ﬁrms that defaulted at least once over the period 1998-2003
(see table A3.1), and 1,8 million ﬁrm/quarter observations (see table 2.1), among which 338,098 with
defaults made (see table 2.4). Each ﬁrm defaults on average 3.5 times per quarter (given default) for an
amount almost twice as large as in the whole population (i.e. EUR4,500 against EUR2,500, compare
tables 2.4 and A2.1), which reﬂects the trimming of micro-ﬁrms. Importantly, the fact that CIPE is
exhaustive for the population of French ﬁrms ensures that a ﬁrm that is not present in our data set as a
defaulter in a given quarter did indeed not default at all during this quarter. On the side of the defaults
faced, however, we could only identify 85% of the ﬁrms with balance sheets that faced defaults.32 In
addition, since we calculated the quarterly default variables with the defaults that originated from the
ﬁrms present in our sample only, our data set is not exhaustive in this dimension. It ﬁnally includes
29,007 ﬁrms that faced defaults at least once over the period 1998-2003 (see table A3.1) and contains
131,660 ﬁrm/quarter observations with at least one default faced (see table 2.4). Each ﬁrm is defaulted
upon on average 3.2 times per quarter (given default) for an average amount of EUR4,900, which is
slightly larger than the average amount of default made, reﬂecting the fact that we do not take into
account the smaller defaults that originate from the ﬁrms out of our sample.
We show in table A3.2 that the sectoral distribution of assets is similar to that in the original
balance sheet database, even though we dropped relatively more ﬁrms from the services-to-business and
transport sectors than from the manufacturing sectors. Overall, our data set accounts for 62% of total
assets in the original balance sheet database.
32We could identify 82,000 ﬁrms with balance sheets that were defaulted upon, out of approximatively 95,600 (see table
A3.1).
36Table A3.2: Sectoral Distribution of Assets and Coverage
balance sheet our
database data set % of total assets in (1)
% share in total assets (1) (2) which are also in (2)
Manufacturing sector 38 56 93
Manufacture of intermediate goods 13 21 97
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 5 8 95
Manufacture of capital goods 8 12 90
Manufacture of consumers goods 6 9 90
Manufacture of motor vehicles 5 7 87
Retail trade, repair of personal and household goods 5 8 90
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 2 3 85
Wholesale trade and commission trade 12 14 72
Construction 4 3 56
Transports 12 8 44
Personal and domestic services 4 2 33
Services to businesses 24 6 17
Total 100 100 62
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